Cite as: Eric Engle, Legal interpretation by computer: A Survey of Interpretive Rules, 5 Akron Intellectual Property Journal 71-93 (2011).
|
Eric Engle* |
|
|
I. Introduction ..................................... |
|
71 |
|
|
A. Computers in Law .................. |
........ |
71 |
II. |
B. The Limits of the Formalism/Realism Dichotomy ......... |
73 |
|
Interpretive Methods ............................. |
|
75 |
|
|
A. Formalist Rules of Statutory Construction |
......... |
75 |
|
B. Argumentation: Methods which constrain |
89 |
|
|
Interpretation............................. |
|
|
III. |
The Computer Program ............... |
............ |
92 |
IV. |
Conclusions ................................. |
|
92 |
I. INTRODUCTION
A.Computers in Law
Computers in law have been used to present mainly for computer- aided legal instruction (programmed instruction)' and automated
Dr.Jur., M.Sc. (abd), Professor of Law,
COMMENT 565 (2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1020460;
Smoke and Mirrorsor Science? Teaching Law
With
Rico Protect Human Rights? A Computer Analysis of a
Using WYSH ComputerProgramsto Model: The Alien Tort ClaimsAct, 6 YALE J. L. & TECH. 161 (2004), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=1 020449&rec=1 &srcabs=1020460, which contains extensive descriptions of the state of play in computer modeling of law including links to other scholars working in this field.
1. See, e.g., Dan Hunter, Teaching ArtificialIntelligence to Law Students, 3 LAW TECH. J. 3
(Oct. 1994), available at http://www.buscalegis.ufsc.br/revistas/index.php/buscalegis/article/viewFile/5268/4837 (discussing
71
72 |
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL |
[5:71 |
research 2 (e.g.,
Westlaw, Lexis). Computers can, however, also be used for
representing legal
express various philosophical schisms, such as epistemological realism, or noetic eidetic reality, versus epistemological materialism, or empiricism. However, as the formalism/realism split is best documented and most influential, at least in contemporary American legal scholarship, the article focuses on it as a representative type of the sort
the methodological problems involved, especially the problems of developing syllabi for teaching law and Al).
2. See, e.g., Sandip Debnath et al., LawBOT: A Multiagent Assistantfor Legal Research, 4
IEEE |
INTERNET |
COMPUTING |
ONLINE |
|
2000), |
3. See generally John Aikin, Computers and Human Reason, WASH. ST. ASSN OF DATA PROCESSING MANAGERS NEWSL., Info. Processing Mgmt. Ass'n, Olympia WA, July 1, 1977
(reviewing JOSEPH WEIZENBAUM, COMPUTER POWER AND HUMAN REASON: FROM JUDGMENT To
CALCULATION (W.H.
Freeman & Co. 1976) (discussing the use of computers to
automate judicial decisionmaking),
4. Previous efforts at developing artificial
intelligence for law have also focused on expert systems. See G. Greenleaf,
A. Mowbray &
A.L. Tyree, The Datalex Project,
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (1987), available at
201l] |
LEGAL INTERPRETATION BY COMPUTER |
73 |
of
The program accompanying this article
presents the jurist with a series of questions, and from those
questions determines a legal outcome. This shows that
automated
B.The Limits ofthe Formalism/RealismDichotomy
This survey reveals the limits of the formalism/realism dichotomy. An attempt to categorize legal interpretive methods as either formalist or realist soon breaks down in several regards:
1) Axiologically: Both the realists and their opponents were moral cognitivists: they believed moral values existed, but disagreed bitterly about what they were. As a result, moral cognitivism has been largely replaced by neutral moral relativism; not because of the strength of relativist arguments,
74 |
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL |
[5:71 |
but rather due to the mutual exhaustion and opposition of contending moral cognitivists.
2) Epistemologically: The formalist/realist split can also be only partially analyzed as a split between those arguing for empirical materialism (the realists) as opposed to noetic
6
idealism ("pure theory"). We could describe this split using the shorthand of "Marx vs. Plato." However (neo)platonic noetic theories have more or less been universally abandoned in favor of materialist arguments, which range from Richard Posner on the right to Karl Marx on the left. Plenty of "classical" legal scholars are, like realists, materialists.
3) Politically: We could argue that realists and realist methods are "left"' and "reform"' oriented in contrast to the "right" "conservative" methods of formalists. We might thus think that the realists would embrace arguments allowing the extension of rules so as to effectuate legal reform, and that the formalists would adhere to formal logic which would conserve and apply existing rules. In fact however, many classical methods of interpretation, such as inductive ampliation, allow the development of new rules out of old ones. Teleological arguments are as old as Aristotle, yet are considered, at least here, as "realist" because they enable legal reform by opening the scope of judicial discretion.
4) Economically: The realist/formalist
dichotomy also ignores reality. Conservative judges have not
had much difficulty adopting economic arguments. Yet economic
arguments are clearly not an element of classical logic,
though they are one form of phronesis, that is practical
reasoning. Economic analysis of the law is in fact a very
recent phenomenon. While we can say that formalists and
5. Engle, Eric, Artificial Intelligence and Law Using Rule Based Expert Systems (Oct. 21, 2008) (unpublished Master's thesis, Universitaet Bremen) (manuscript at 43), available at http://etdindividuals.dlib.vt.edu:9090/346/1/msc.doc [hereinafter Engle, ArtificialIntelligence].
6.Id.
7.Engle, Eric, Legal Interpretation by Computer: Are Legal Rules Predictable? (Sept. 15,
2008) (unpublished
manuscript
at 7), available
at
8. Engle, ArtificialIntelligence,supra note 5 at 44.
201l] |
LEGAL INTERPRETATION BY COMPUTER |
75 |
method, are often in fact economic arguments. Similarly, balancing tests, the flagship of realism, also often reduce to economic arguments due to the question of how to evaluate the weights of competing interests.9
Consequently, the interpretive methods could be classified as either: (1) formalist rules of statutory construction; (2) formalist methods which constrain interpretation; (3) realist methods of interpretation that favor development of new legal rules; and (4) economic and policy arguments. Here, we analyze interpretation following Savigny's schema,'o and then try to see if the methods can be classified as either realist or formalist and conclude they cannot. Some interpretive methods could be called formalist in some regards, or realist in others.
II.INTERPRETIVE METHODS
A.FormalistRules ofStatutory Construction
1.Text
a. Literal or "Plain Meaning" Interpretation
We start this survey by considering the interpretive rules courts would use in their likely order of application. Since Savigny legal interpretation is seen as moving from text, to context and structure to history and teleology, goals and policies of the law, even in U.S. law."
9.Engle, LegalInterpretation,supra note 7 at 7.
10.FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN
ROEMISCHEN RECHTS,
(1840), available at http://dlib-
pr.mpier.mpg.de/m/kleioc/0010/exec/bigpage/%22199236_00000256%22; see, e.g., Raul Narits,
Interpretationof Law in the Estonian Legal
System, I JURIDICA
INT'L 1996,
11.In the hierarchy of interpretive tools, of course, the statutory language comes first. Only when that language is ambiguous is it necessary to examine first the statute's structure and purpose, and then lastly the legislative history, which is last and least authoritative because it ultimately matters what legislators do, i.e. enact, not what they say about what they do. What various legislators say about a statute is often contradictory, unclear, ambiguous, or merely an expression of one of many competing views of a statute not necessarily shared by others who voted for it. In some instances, however, as here, unambiguous, clear, uncontradicted, and specific legislative history can serve as a reliable
interpretive guide.
McDow v. Smith, 295 B.R. 69, 78, n.18 (E.D.Va., 2003).
76 |
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL |
[5:71 |
Plain meaning arguments state that the law means what it says, nothing more or less: statutes should be interpreted to implement the will of the legislator, not the judiciary. Literal or literalist interpretation is a somewhat pejorative synonym for interpretation according to the plain meaning of the text. The critique is that plain meaning arguments are tautological and provide no criteria to determine whether and when a meaning is "plain."l 2 Furthermore, courts are sometimes, in the interest of justice, willing to ignore the plain language of a statute. 3 A court may reject a literalist interpretation where such interpretation does not conform to "the circumstances surrounding their adoption, or for that matter, with the context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, spirit and purpose, or any other factor to which courts advert in determining a statute's meaning."' 4 Courts sometimes reject the literalist interpretation for those reasons. A literal interpretation of a statute is not admissible where it would lead to "an absurd result." 5 This rule is obviously formalist, and is the first line argued in any statutory interpretation. It is also fairly easily formalized computationally, as is the case of most formalist arguments. If the plain meaning of the text resolves the interpretation then we need not look to other interpretations.
12.See, e.g., Anthony
D'Amato, Counterintuitive Consequences of "Plain
Meaning," 33 ARtZ.
L. REv. 529 (1991); Michael S. Moore, Plain
Meaning and
Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REv. 715 (1992); David A. Strauss, PropterHonoris Respectum: Why Plain
Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565 (1997).
13.See Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942); see also Director, Office Of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Dep't of Labor v. Perini North River Assoc., 459
U.S. 297, (1983).
14.See Hurley Trucking Co., Inc. v. Arizona, 39 P.3d 527 22, (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2002), rev. denied andordereddepublished, Hurley Trucking v. Arizona, 46 P.3d 408 (Ariz. May 21, 2002) (citing Zamora v. Reinstein, 915 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1996)).
15."Although we must give effect to the statute's plain and ordinary meaning, the General Assembly's intent and purpose must prevail over a literalist interpretation that leads to an absurd result." Lagae v. Lackner, 996 P.2d 1281, 1284, (Colo. 2000).However plain the ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute may be, the courts will reject that meaning when to accept it would lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not possibly have been intended by the Legislature or would defeat the plain legislative intention. Kiriakids v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 440
S.E.2d 364, 366 (S.C. 1994).
2011]] |
LEGAL INTERPRETATION BY COMPUTER |
77 |
b.Maxims ofLegal Interpretation
Several maxims of interpretation can be used to determine the plain meaning of the law.
i. Expressio Unius
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a specific type of grammatical interpretation.' 6 It is synonymous with inclusio unius est exclusio alterius." It is a rule of statutory construction. It holds that "the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another." 8 Thus "where a law expressly describes a particular act, thing or person to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded." 9 Further, expressio can also be applied to other similar statutes: "explicit direction for something in one provision, and its absence in a parallel provision, implies an intent to negate it in the second context." 20 Where the legislator gives a list of exceptions to a rule that list shall be considered exclusive.2 ' However, expressio unius is subject to legislative intent: where the legislative intent is clearly contrary, expressio unius will not apply.22 Thus some of the interpretive rules are explicitly hierarchized, this does not however appear to be the case for all the interpretive rules.
ii. Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus no exceptis
Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis (an exception affirms the rule in cases not excepted).2 3 This maxim appears to be a reformulation of expressio unius.2 4
16. Burgin v. Forbes, 169 S.W.2d 321, 325 (Ky. 1943); Newblock v. Bowles, 40 P.2d 1097,
1100 (Okla. 1935).
17.See Burgin, 169 S.W.2d at 325.
18.Manchin v. Dunfee, 327 S.E.2d 710, 712 (1984); see also Riffle v. Ranson, 464 S.E.2d 763, 770 (W. Va. 1995) ("Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (express mention of one thing implies exclusion of all others)").
19.People v. Aarons, 305 A.D.2d 45, 51 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (quoting McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 1, Stat. ยง 240).
20.Clinchfield Coal Co. v. FMSHRC, 895 F.2d 773, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
21.See People v. Municipal Court 574 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1978).
22.See In re Joseph B., 671 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1983).
23.Wyer v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 1999 Me. Super. LEXIS 135, 15, n.2 (1999).
24.See Bankers Sec. Life Ins. Soc. v. Kane, 689 F. Supp. 1164, 1l72 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
78 |
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL |
[5:71 |
iii. Ejusdem generis
Where specific words enumerate persons or things, general words following them are not to be construed in their widest sense but rather are limited to apply only to persons or things of the same class specifically mentioned.25 The general words following the specific words shall be interpreted no more generally than the specific preceding words.26 Thus ejusdem generis is a type of syntactic argument. In fact it closely resembles "expressio unius" but appears to refer to contracts rather than statutes.27
iv. Generalibus specialia derogant
Where two hierarchically rules of law conflict with each other, one using specific terms, and the other general terms, any conflict in interpretation resulting is resolved by determining that the special section is controlling. This is summarized in the maxim Generalibus specialia derogant (special provisions derogate from general ones).28 Generalibus specialia derogant seems to be a variant of expressio unius. Similarly, where the special statute is enacted after the general statute, the applicable maxim of statutory interpretation is 'generalibus specialia derogant' (special things take from general).29
At an even broader level, "The general principle to be applied to the construction of acts of Parliament is that a general act is not to be construed to repeal a previous particular act, unless there is some express reference to the previous legislation on the subject, or unless there is a necessary inconsistency in the two acts standing together.',30 Because,
[Tihe legislature having had its attention directed to a special subject, and having observed all the circumstances of the case and provided for
them, does not intent [sic], by a general enactment afterwards, to
25. General Roofing Company v. Borough of Belmar, 187 A.2d 16, 17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1962).
26.See U.S. v. LaBrecque, 419 F. Supp. 430, 434 (D.C. N.J. 1976).
27.See id.; Aleksich v. Indus. Accident Fund, 151 P.2d 1016, 1021 (Mont. 1944).
28.See Holloway v. Henderson, 82 So. 344, 345 (Ala. 1919); McFountain v. State, 83 So. 53 (Ala. 1919), and cases cited; Herring v. Griffin, 100 So. 202 (Ala. 1924).
29.See Bank of Montreal v. Signet Bank, 193 F.3d 818, 833 (4th Cir. 1999); Blue Mountain Serv. Corp. v. Zlateff, 769 P.2d 883 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Brown Paper Mill Co., Inc. v. Commr. of Internal Revenue, 255 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1958).
30.Ex
201l] |
LEGAL INTERPRETATION BY COMPUTER |
79 |
derogate from its own act when it makes no special mention of its intention so to do.
v.Lex posterior derogat legi priori lex posterior derogat anterior/lex posterior derogat priori
The maxim "lex posterior derogat priori" states that "between an earlier and a later law, the later prevails."32 At first this may seem to be in conflict with the maxim "expressio unius." That is not in fact the case.
One argument against the authority of legal maxims is that they are contradictory. However the author's research reveals otherwise. Several methods at first glance do seem redundant, but not contradictory. These include Ejusdem generis, Generalibus specialia derogant, Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus no exceptis, and Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. All appear to say the same thing: a posterior general statute must be contextualized by the prior specific statute such that the general instances in the second statute (or contract, in the case of ejusdem generis) may not be interpreted more generally than, or in conflict with, the prior statute absent express legislative intent. The maxim of lex posterior derogat priori might at first appear to be in conflict with the maxim expressio unius. But we must remember that just as we read statutes so that they are not in conflict with each other or with the constitution so must we also read maxims in that way. Lex posterior states that a later law will supplant an earlier law.34 It expresses the general case. Thus a true example of "lex posterior" is the case where the prior law is simply abrogated completely. Expressio unius is then the special case where the prior law addresses the subject with specific terms and is followed by a later statute that expresses the subject in more general terms.35 Further, this can be seen as a fair interpretation when we see that expressio unius only applies where no specific legislative intent can be found to overturn the earlier law. Finally, these maxims all serve to implement the democratically elected legislature and operate according to predictable
31. Id. at
54).
32.Gouveia v. Vokes, 800
F. Supp. 241,
33.Engle, Legal Interpretation,supranote 7, at 13.
34.Id.
35.Id.
36.State v. Crawford, 39 185 P.3d 315, 317 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
80 |
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL |
[5:71 |
rules of formal logic. Thus, though the maxims do not always have express hierarchies, such hierarchization can be derived.
vi. Actor Incombit Probari
This argument is merely the statement of the general principle that the moving party must bear the burden of proof.37 Sometimes, however, that fact will decide the issue.
vii. Dura lex, sed lex
This maxim is positivist and formalist. It holds that that the law is the law and must apply regardless of its consequences because the function of the court is merely to adjudicate and not to make law.38 This argument will not carry much weight in modem courts.39
2. Context and Structure
a. Syntactic Interpretation/Grammatical Interpretation
If the plain meaning interpretation does not resolve the statutory argument we must then look to the context and structure of the statute. Syntactic arguments parse each term of the statute carefully and the syntactic position of each within the sentence to resolve linguistic ambiguities. 40 For example, does "and" mean "both/and" or merely "either/or?" Does "or" mean "either A or B, but not both," or instead "either A or B, and possibly both?" In other words, must cruel and unusual punishments be both cruel and unusual to be unconstitutional or merely cruel or unusual? In syntactic interpretation, the position of the word within the sentence, punctuation, conjunctions, and any other syntactic clues are taken as evidence of the legislator's intent. 41 Syntactic interpretation must not reach an absurd result.4 2
37.Engle, Artificial Intelligence,supranote 5, at 98.
38.See In re Cobos, 994 S.W.2d 313, 316 n.3 (Tex. App. 1999) ("The law is harsh, but it is
the law.").
39.See id.
40.See L. Allen & M. Caldwell, Modern Logic and JudicialDecision Making: A Sketch of
One View, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 226 (1963) (on syntactic argument).
41.Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Murphy, 511 N.E.2d 515, 517 (1987).
42.For example, where a counterfeiter argued that a word modified only the word immediately preceding it and not the entire group of words, the court held through syntactic argument that the criminal's exculpatory argument was no valid defence. United States. v. Stanley, 23 F.3d 1084, 1086 (6th Cir. 1994).
2011] |
LEGAL INTERPRETATION BY COMPUTER |
81 |
Grammatical arguments likewise parse the
sentence structure looking for clues as to the legislative
intent. Here however the focus is not on individual words and
their positions in the sentence but rather on phrases,
clauses, and parts of speech.43 Objections to syntactic and
grammatical interpretation are that they search for a
b. Contextual Interpretation/Systematic Interpretation
Contextual interpretations, also known as systematic interpretation," interpret the particular law as an expression of a general law and thus determine the law according to the superior hierarchical norm.4 5 No new rule is inferred; rather the existing rule is expanded or contracted so that it is congruent with hierarchically superior norms.4 6 In systematic interpretation, the
43. J.R. Harris v. Commonwealth, 128 S.E. 578, 579 (Va. 1925).
44.[I]n German jurisprudence, contextual interpretation is called systematic interpretation. Under this approach, ambiguous words are eliminated by reference to other related provisions or concepts in which the same word or term appears. For example, if, in the abortion question, one has to determine whether the term "life" in the constitution comprises unborn human life, one can search for the meaning of "life". in other legal texts to discover what protection "life" has received on the constitutional level. The main goal of contextual interpretation usually is the furtherance of the consistency and coherence of all relevant legal norms, that is, legal certainty. If possible, legal terms or concepts should have consistent meanings in all the places where they are being used. At the very least, their meanings should not conflict!
Winfried Brugger, Concretizationof Law and StatutoryInterpretation, 11 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F.
207, 237 (1996).
45."In systematic interpretation, one attempts to clarify the meaning of a legal provision by
reading it in conjunction with other,
related provisions of the same section, or title, of the legal
text, or even other texts within or outside the given legal
system; thus, this method relies upon the unity, or at least
the consistency, of the legal world." Winfried Brugger, Legal Interpretation,Schools of
Jurisprudence,andAnthropology 42
AM. J. COMP. L. 395,
46. For an application of the principle of systematic interpretation see Case Concerning Border and TransborderActions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J. 69, 94 (Dec. 20, 1988); Advisory Opinion No. 13, Competence of the InternationalLabor Organizationto Regulate, Incidentally,the PersonalWork ofthe Employer, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 13, at 23 (cited in Karsten Nowrot, Emily
82 |
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL |
[5:71 |
legal interpretation is determined not by reference to legislative intent but squarely within the legal text itself.47
Systematic interpretation of the law is exceptional in the common law because, for example, "courts are constitutionally limited to resolve only those issues brought before the bench, a comprehensive, systematic interpretation of the Loft Law is not to be expected.",4 It is however more often found internationally. Thus, for example, systematic interpretation of the U.N. charter interprets a rule "in the general
9 The structure and scheme of the Charter [of the United Nations]."A
legal rule is thus determined by comparing it with other rules established in the treaty or by referring to the entire structure of the treaty.50 Again, these are forms of structural interpretation.
c. Synthetic interpretation
Synthetic interpretation synthesizes a new rule through ampliation of existing rules.5' In synthetic interpretation rule one, two . . . to rule n, whether or not hierarchically equal, imply together a new rule, rule n+1. Rather than interpreting rule one in the light of rule two through n, hierarchical interpretation derives a new rule.52 Thus synthetic interpretations "focus on the aims of the treaty and its institutional objectives."53 This is still a form of structural interpretation, but the most open one and could be characterized for that reason as more realist than formalist. According to synthetic arguments, we should view the law in question as one thread in a larger tapestry; the individual law
W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore Democracy: InternationalLegal Implicationsof the Ecowas Intervention in Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 321, 341 (1998)).
47.
subjective) intention of the legislator, but rather seeks the logical objective meaning of the statute, as an expression of the law. According to this second approach, legal texts have a meaning of their own, implicit in the signs of which they are composed, and independent ofthe actual or presumed will of their authors.
Eduardo Garcia MAynez, Introducci6n al
estudio del derecho [Introduction to the Study of Law] (33d ed., 1982) translatedin Robert S.
Barker, 30 U. MIAMI
48.Franmar Infants Wear, Inc. v. Rios, 491 N.Y.S.2d 975, 998, (N.Y.City Civ.Ct., 1985).
49. Certain Expenses ofthe UN., 1962 I.C.J 6, 11.
50."Under the systematic method of interpretation, the meaning of the norm is ascertained by comparison with other norms set forth in the treaty and by referencing the entire structure of the treaty." Nowrot and Karsten, supra note 46, at 341
51.Engle, LegalInterpretation,supranote 7, at 10.
52.Engle, ArtificialIntelligence,supranote 5, at 64.
53.MICHAEL H. LANE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE CUSTOMS MODERNIZATION AND THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE SUPERHIGHWAY.
201l] |
LEGAL INTERPRETATION BY COMPUTER |
83 |
cannot be interpreted in a vacuum. Rather we must consider the other laws flanking it in order to understand the meaning of this law within that context. Synthetic interpretation can open up the interpretations of laws that might otherwise be plain facially. For example, reading the Nineteenth Amendment's alteration of the Fourteenth Amendment so that their combined force is to ensure constitutional equality for women is an exercise in "synthetic interpretation" of the Constitution. 4 Namely, the interpreter synthesizes two or more legal texts into a whole, which in fact may be greater than the each part because those two parts work together synergistically.5
d. Concretization
Concretization is essentially a principle of administrative law interpretation according to which the judge takes a function of "filling gaps" to help realize the legislative scheme for the administrative agency.5 6 Concretization views laws, particularly laws which determine administrative procedures, as foundational bricks and regards the decisions of administrative courts as being the mortar which fills in the open texture of the foundational laws.57 Concretization is a form of structural argument. One judge states:
I view the
process of administrative
54.See Bruce Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 459
(1989).
55.See Allen &Caldwell, supra note 40, at 226.
56.Engle, LegalInterpretation,supra note 7 at 13.
57.Id.
84 |
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL |
[5:71 |
are finished only through the judicial decision and its execution. The process through which law constantly creates itself anew goes from the general and abstract to the individual and concrete. It is a process of steadily increasing individualization and concretization.' 5 8
e. Legal Completion (Rechtsergaenzung)/Legal Interpretation
This type of interpretation seeks to cure lacunes in the law by examining a phrase in the law with respect to that same phrase as elsewhere defined in the law.59 It is a form of structural interpretation.
3. History (Historical/Genetic Interpretation)
If the text,
context, or structure of the statute do not resolve the
interpretive conflict we must then consider the statutory
history to see the legislator's intent. Historical
interpretation examines the legal history surrounding the
creation of the statute in a search for legislative intent, an
example of the
58. Ethics
Comm'n v. Keating, 958
P.2d 1250 (Okla. 1998); see also Federal Trade Comm'n v.
Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952) ("The right or obligation
results not merely from the abstract expression of the will of
Congress in the statute, but from the Commission's completion
and concretization ofthat will in its order."); State v.
Martin, 532
P.2d 316, 323 (Alaska 1975)
(holding that "absent judicial concretization, the
ordinary citizen desiring to comply with the law would be
forced to speculate" about the laws impact on him); In re
59.Engle, Legal Interpretation,supranote 7, at 9.
60."In historical analysis, the interpreter attempts to identify what the founders of a legal
document wanted to regulate when they used certain words and sentences; here, both the specific and the general declarations of intent are of crucial importance." Brugger, supranote 45, at 397.
61. Engle, Artificial Intelligence,supra note 5, at 62.
201l] |
LEGAL INTERPRETATION BY COMPUTER |
85 |
4.Teleology "Realist" Methods of Interpretation that Favor Development of New Legal Rules
The following arguments can be considered "realist" as many of them, such as probabilistic reasoning, have only come to be accepted in the last century and further because they tend to "open up" the interpretation to allow application to new cases or even to create new rules altogether.6 2 As such they are more difficult to model algorithmically, but nonetheless are tractable.
a. Probabalistic Reasoning
The classical problem in torts of
probabilistic reasoning occurs when we have several potential
tortfeasors and a definite victim of an instrumentality common
to all tortfeasors. For example, consider three manufacturers
of a carcinogenic product, and it is unknown which of the
three produced the defective product in the case at bar. The
idea is to argue that each potential tortfeasor should be held
proportionally liable according to market share, even though
causation cannot be proven, to avoid the absurd result of
62.Engle,, LegalInterpretation,supra note 7, at 18.
63.See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
64.Abad v. Bayer Corporation, 563 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2009).
65.In re TMI Litigation 193 F.3d 613, 640 (3d Cir. 1999).
66.See, e.g., Sindell, 607 P.2d at fn. 28.
86 |
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL |
[5:71 |
Thus the strength of the argument is proportionate to its probability.67 A probabilistic proof need not, as illustrated above, be 100% certain. "Proof of a material fact by inference from circumstantial evidence need not be so conclusive as to exclude every other hypothesis. It is sufficient if the evidence produces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief in the probability of the existence of the material fact."68 Inferences are determined as valid or not depending on whether the inference is "so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable." 69 That is, an inference may be merely supported by the evidence and does not need to be compelled by the evidence as the only possibility.70 Juries are permitted to "chain" several inferences into a series of inferences leading to a conclusion which would not be supportable if the inferential chain's elements were viewed separately.7' A jury is free to make inculpatory as well as exculpatory inferences.72 This method could be seen as formalist because the market shares are determinate or as realist since it is not a clear bright line test that will lead to a certain foreseeable result.
b. Comparative Argument
The essence of comparative argumentation is that the courts of this jurisdiction should be willing to compare the decisions of other jurisdictions in making their determinations as to what the law is or should be.73 For example, in Geddes Lawrence v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme court considered decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in reaching the decision that criminalization of homosexual acts was unconstitutional.74 The Supreme Court also used comparative method in EasternAirlines, Inc. v. Floyd to determine the interpretation of the French words "l6sion corporelle" in a treaty to which the U.S. was a signatory and in which French was the official language.7 s Similarly the Pinochet cases in Britain cited extensively to U.S. decisions as
67.Goldhirsh Group, Inc. v. Alpert, 107 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1997).
68.State v. Copas, 746 A.2d 761, 782 (Conn. 2000) (citing Service Road Corp. v. Quinn, 698 A.2d 258 (Conn. 1997)); accordPierce v. Albanese, 129 A.2d 606 (Conn. 1957).
69.State v. Ford, 646 A.2d 147 (Conn. 1994).
70.Copas, 746 A.2d at 782.
71.State v. Crafts, 627 A.2d 877, 882 (Conn. 1993).
72.See State v. Stanley, 613 A.2d 788, 792 (Conn. 1992).
73.Engle,Artificial Intelligence,supranote 5, at 75.
74.539 U.S. 558, 560, 573 (2003).
75. 499 U.S. 530,
201l] |
LEGAL INTERPRETATION BY COMPUTER |
87 |
persuasive evidence of British law as to immunity, comity and other common law doctrines relevant to international law.76 It can be characterized as a realist method because it opens the scope of interpretation to judicial discretion.
c. Teleological Argument (also called logical interpretation)
Once text, context, structure, and history are exhausted interpretation looks to the ends, or goals, of the law. Teleology, also known as final causality,77 is the idea of Aristotle that objects contain within themselves the blueprints of their own ultimate development. For examples, the teleology of an acorn is a mighty oak; the teleology of a boy is a man. Legal teleology argues that law serves intermediate ends as means to the ultimate end of justice," whether distributive, also known as "geometric" or "social" justice, or commutative, also known as "arithmetic" or "transactional" justice.80 A teleological argument of criminal law would hold that the purpose of a criminal law is not merely to deter and punish but also to correct so that the criminal reaches their full human potential. Teleological arguments have appeared, for example, in areas of law as diverse as equal protection jurisprudence and banking law.8 ' Teleological argument can trump literal arguments.82 Teleological argument could be considered realist in that it leaves a large scope to judicial discretion.
d.
One of the preferred methods of legal realist jurisprudence is multi- factor interest balancing tests.83 I such tests the court weighs the interests of all relevant parties, not necessarily merely the interests of the
76.See Eric Engle, Alien
Torts in Europe?Human Rights and Tort in EuropeanLaw, ZERP Discussion Paper, DP 1/2005, availableat
77.Book Review, John Courtney Murray And The American Civil Conversation 10 J.L. &
RELIGION 589, 594 (1993/1994).
78.U.S. v. General Dynamics Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1497, 1500 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
79.See Aristotle, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V. (c. 350 B.C.).
80.Id.
81.Kite v. Marshall, 661 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir. 1981).
82.Fidelity Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 689 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir.
1982).
83.See James G. Wilson, Surveying
the FormsofDoctrineon the
Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 773 (1995); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age ofBalancing,96 YALE L.J. 943, 945 (1987).
88 |
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL |
[5:71 |
plaintiff and defendant.84 The court then determines the
relevant weight of these various interests and then
determines which group of interests is predominant and uses
this preponderation to determine whether and how the law
applies.85
e. Economic and Policy Arguments
i. Economic Argument
Economic arguments are
extremely popular in the United States "[T]he common law
is best explained as if the judges were trying to maximize
economic
welfare . . .. Common law adjudication brings the
economic system closer to the results
that would be produced by effective
84.See, e.g. Rhode v. Adams, 957 P.2d 1124, 1127 (Mont. 1998).
85.Engle, ArtificialIntelligence,supra note 5, at 76.
86.RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, p.
87.Engle, ArtificialIntelligence,supranote 5, at 78.
88.See, e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ANTICHRIST; BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL. See DAVID
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, Book III, Part I, j 1.
2011] |
LEGAL INTERPRETATION BY COMPUTER |
89 |
ii. Policy Arguments
Arguments from policy are a sort of teleological argument and can be seen as realist in that they open argument to judicial discretion. Policy arguments look at the goals served by the laws in order to interpret the meaning of the law. 9 However, if policy arguments are to avoid question begging then we need to determine what the exact policy or policies are that justify the interpretation. Legal certainty, judicial economy, conservation of scarce resources, preservation of a free market, and the encouragement of the production of wealth are all examples of broad ranging policies used to guide interpretation of law.
B. Argumentation: Methods which constrainInterpretation
Realist and interpretivist methods tend to open up interpretation to allow creative lawyering and judging; formalist and originalist arguments reduce the possible range of applications of a legal rule. Rightly or not, just as realism is seen as left wing, formalism is seen as conservative.
1. Deductive Argument (Syllogism)
Deductive Argument reasons from general principles to specific instances. 90 For example, the statute provides a general rule and the specific facts of the case are argued as fitting the rule. In common law courts that is about the extent of deductive argument, and indeed, courts sometimes make errors in logic.91 However, in civil law courts deductive reasoning plays the principle role. In civil law courts it is possible to argue deductively from generally recognized principles of law to determine outcomes in specific cases.
2. Bright Line Tests
Bright line tests are merely
89.Engle, ArtificialIntelligence,supranote 5, at 78.
90.People v. Martinez, 51 P.3d 1046, 1050 (Colo. App. 2001).
91.For an example of clearly erroneous misapplication of the U.S. federal appeals court see,
Miller v. Champion EnterprisesInc., 346 F.3d 660, 679 (6th Cir. 2003). The court in Helwig v.
Vencor, 251 F.3d 540,
92. Engle, LegalInterpretation,supra note 7, at 15.
90 |
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL |
[5:71 |
the formalist, they are the bulwark of the
rule of law, for law must be foreseeable to be valid both in
the sense of its own legitimacy and in the sense of an
effective admonition to potential
3. Analogical Argument
Arguments by analogy hold that the decision in case A should apply to case B because cases A and B have several facts in common and the points which they do not have in common are essentially irrelevant to the applicability of the decision. The argument of analogy is that likes should be treated alike. However:
Logicians teach that one must always appraise an analogical argument very carefully. Several criteria may be used: (1) the acceptability of the analogy will vary proportionally with the number of circumstances that have been analyzed; (2) the acceptability will depend upon the number of positive resemblances (similarities) and negative resemblances (dissimilarities); or (3) the acceptability will be influenced by the relevance of the purported analogies.
For Appellants to draw a proper analogy, they had the burden in the district court, as they do here, of showing that the similarities in the facts of the two cases outweigh the differences. 93
4. Reductio ad absurdam Proof
Reductio arguments are elegant and powerful in simplicity but in the author's opinion, and that of some courts, are somewhat risky as they depend on the truth of all presumptions in the argument.94 Essentially, an argument by reductio presumes the opposite of what is to be proven, and shows that that presumption leads to a logical impossibility, in
93.See In Re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation, 305 F.3d 145, 157 (3d. Cir. 2002) (citing Irving
M. Copi & Keith
Determining the Ratio Decidendiof a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 179 (1930); JOHN H. WIGMORE,
WIGMORE'S CODE OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT LAw 118 (3d ed.
1942); JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC RATIOCINATIVE AND
INDUCTIVE
is true of the other.").
94."Reductio ad absurdum arguments frequently are untrustworthy, and this one should be
examined with care." Cf. J. Parreco & Son, 567 A.2d 46 (D.C. 1989) (warning against judicial overeagerness to invoke the "absurd result" doctrine as a guide to construction)." Richardson v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 826 A.2d 310, 352 (D.C. 2003) (dissent).
201l] |
LEGAL INTERPRETATION BY COMPUTER |
91 |
theoretical terms, or to an absurdity, in
practical terms.95 Vulgar
forms of this argument can be criticized as conclusory, merely
asserting that the position of the opponent ludicrous.
However,
5. Inductive Argument
Arguments by induction, the principal engine of common law reasoning, are similar to arguments by analogy. 9 6 Inductive logic, reasoning from particular instances to general rules, is the opposite of deductive logic, which is reasoning from general rules to particular cases.97 Both are admissible forms of reasoning in the common law, though deduction generally corresponds to statutory law and induction to case law.
In an inductive ampliation we infer a general rule to govern a series of similar cases from the fact that that series of cases had both a similar rule and similar facts.99 Sometimes the common law is presented as being ampliative. Inductive ampliation and reasoning by analogy are similar but not the same. In ampliation we infer a new rule from an existing set of cases and rules. In reasoning by analogy we apply the rule in one case to determine the rule in another case due to their factual similarity.'0 0 No new rule is inferred in the case of reasoning by analogy, unlike inductive ampliation.
95.Engle, Artificial Intelligence,supranote 5, at 72.
96.The engine of the common law is inductive
reasoning. It proceeds from the particular to the general.
It is an experimental method which builds its rules in tiny
increments, case-
Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 409 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1980).
97.Dunn v. State, 454 So.2d 641, 646 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
98."[E]vidence can be either direct or circumstantial; that we can establish truth via
inductive reasoning, as well as by deductive reasoning." Wilson v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. 739 So. 2d 802, 802, (La. Ct. App. 1998) (Fitzsimmons, concurring opinion).
99.Engle, Artificial Intelligence,supranote 5, at 73.
100.See United States v. Tapia, 309 F.3d 1283 (10th Cir. 2002); In Re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation, 305 F.3d 145, 158 (3d. Cir. 2002).
92 |
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL |
[5:71 |
III. THE COMPUTER PROGRAM
The rules exposed above are used as a rule
base for a computer program to model legal
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This survey shows that economic thought pervades Anglo- American legal discourse. It also shows that the law is fundamentally conservative: not merely through burdens of proof weighing against moving parties, but also in the economic evaluation of the weight to be affected to different variables used to represent particular legal methods. Seeing the extent and limits of modeling law by computer reveals the extent of objectivity in the law.
Individual legal methods can be readily
formalized, while the choice of which legal methods to apply
are less so. Thus, that aspect of legal interpretation was not
modeled. Interpretive rules are decidable,
201l] |
LEGAL INTERPRETATION BY COMPUTER |
93 |
realism. We see clearly the problem of
101. "Savigny
distinguished, in modem parlance, textual, verbal or
grammatical interpretation, systematic, structural or
contextual interpretation, and historical interpretation."
Brugger, supra note 45, at