1. "A general definition
of 'social dumping' is suggested by Grossmann and Koopmann:
'Unlike conventional dumping which means selling abroad below cost
or at lower prices than charged in the home market, 'social
dumping' refers to costs that are for their part depressed below a
'natural' level by means of 'social oppression' facilitating
unfair pricing strategies against foreign competitors. Remedial
action would either consist of the offending firms consenting to
raise their prices accordingly or failing that, imposing
equivalent import restrictions."' Bob
Hepple,
A Race to the Top? International Investment Guidelines and
Corporate Codes of Conduct, 20 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 347,
347 (1999) (citing Harald
Grossmann
& Georg Koopmann, Social Standards in International Trade, A
New Protectionist Wave?, in World Trade After the Uruguay Round
115, 116 (Harald Sander & Andras Inotai eds., 1996)).
2. Id.
3. See generally Kevin
R.
Johnson, International Human Rights Class Actions: New Frontiers
for Group Litigation, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 643 (2004); Beth
Van
Schaack, Unfulfilled Promise: The Human Rights Class Action,
2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 279 (2003); Paul
R.
Dubinsky, Justice for the Collective: The Limits of the Human
Rights Class Action, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1152 (2004), inter
alia.
4. See Eric Allen Engle, Corporate
Social
Responsibility (CSR): Market-Based Remedies for International
Human Rights Violations?, 40 Willamette L. Rev. 103, 111-14
(2004).
5. Edward
B.
Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo. L.J. 445, 482 (1991).
6. "[S]hareholder
democracy does not permit the majority to set company policy
directly. Shareholder resolutions are merely suggestions to the
board of directors, and attempts to control the directors by
majority vote will be rebuffed[.]" Anupam
Chander,
Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 Yale L.J. 119,
127 (2003).
7. Sec. Exchange Act of
1934 §14(a), 17
C.F.R.
§240.14a-2 (2006).
8. Id.; Cynthia
A.
Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197, 1204 (1999).
9. Shireen
B.
Rahnema, The SEC's Reversal of Cracker Barrel: A Return to
Uncertainty, 7 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 273, 274-275 (1999).
10. Tara
L.
C. Van Ho, Reconstructing the Marriage of Ownership and Control:
Is the SEC Missing an Important Step in Its Hesitancy to Adopt
Proposed Rule 14a-11?, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1211, 1213 (2005).
11. Margaret
M.
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 291 (1999).
12. "Shareholder
resolutions are the main vehicle for these principles'
implementation, and all shareholder resolutions failed.
Nevertheless, five states--Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New York, and Rhode Island-- adopted the MacBride Principles to
guide their investment policies regarding TNCs in Northern
Ireland, causing many companies to take notice." Barbara
A.
Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6
Minn. J. Global Trade 153, 176 (1997).
13. Id.
14. Van Ho, supra note
10, at 1213.
15. Id. at 1214.
16. Brent A. Olson, 1
Publicly Traded Corporations: Governance & Reg. Appendix 8A
(2d ed. 2005).
17. Van Ho, supra note
10, at 1213.
18. Andrew
R.
Brownstein & Igor Kirman, Can a Board Say No When
Shareholders Say Yes? Responding to Majority Vote Resolutions,
60 Bus. Law. 23, 56 (2004).
19. Sec.
Exchange
Act of 1934 §14(a)-8(d), 15
U.S.C.S.
§78(n) (LexisNexis 2006). See generally, SEC Division of
Corporate Finance Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14, available at
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14.htm.
20. Olson, supra note 16.
21. Van Ho, supra note
10, at 1214.
22. Del.
Code
Ann. tit. 8, §§ 109, 211 (2001).
23. Jae
Yeol
Kwon, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance: A
Comparative Approach to the South Korean Statutory Scheme, 12
Minn. J. Global Trade 299, 305 (2003).
24. Larry
E.
Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 183, 197
(2004).
25. Blair & Stout,
supra note 11, at 291.
26. "Shareholders have no
right to direct or control the corporation, its board or its
managers... shareholders have no right to bind a public
corporation, its directors, or its managers." Daniel J.H.
Greenwood,
Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious Race to the Bottom/Top,
23 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 381, 435 (2005).
27. Meredith
M.
Stead, Book Note, How Incentive Pay For Executives Isn't--And
What We Can Do About It, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 722, 727 (2005)
(reviewing Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without
Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation
(2004)).
28. Stephen
M.
Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,
57 Vand. L. Rev. 83, 105 n.133 (2004) (citing Bayless
Manning, The American Stockholder, 67 Yale L.J. 1477, 1485-89
(1958)).
29. Lucian
Arye
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L.
Rev. 833, 862 (2005).
30. Thomas
W.
Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporating
Corporate Governance Analysis into First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 43 (2001).
31. Lucian
Arye
Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law
Evolution, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 489, 492 (2002).
32. Sharon
Hannes,
Corporate Stagnation: Discussion and Reform Proposal, 30 J.
Corp. L. 51, 79 (2004).
33. Susan
W.
Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule,
18 Ga. L. Rev. 425, 461 n.180 (1984).
34. Id. (internal
citations omitted).
35. Brownstein &
Kirman, supra note 18, at 56.
36. Id. at 56-57.
37. Id. at 57.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 52.
40. Brownstein &
Kirman, supra note 18, at 52-53.
41. Id. at 59-60.
42. Id. at 60.
43. Id.
44. Charles
Mark
Holt, B. Alford v. Shaw: North Carolina Adopts a Prophylactic
Rule to Prevent Termination of Shareholders' Derivative Suits
Through Special Litigation Committees, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 1228,
1228 (1986).
45. Bebchuk, supra note
29, at 844.
46. Id. at 844-45.
47. Id. at 845-46.
48. Id. at 844.
49. Id.
50. Lynn
A.
Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on
Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance,
152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 667, 693 (2003) (internal citations
omitted).
51. Fin. Indus. Fund,
Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474
F.2d
514, 518 (10th Cir. 1973).
52. Joy v. North, 692
F.2d
880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982).
53. Sec. Exchange Act of
1934 §14(a)-8, 17
C.F.R.
§240.14a-8 (2006).
54. Note,
Legal
Tools for Altering Labor Conditions Abroad, 118 Harv. L. Rev.
2202, 2222 (2005).
55. Sec. Exchange Act of
1934 §14a-8(i), 17
C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8(i) (2006).
56. Rahnema, supra note
9, at 276 n.11.
57. See e.g., Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604,
607-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
58. Rosenfeld v.
Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128
N.E.2d
291, 293 (N.Y. 1955).
59. Jeffrey
Nesteruk,
Bellotti and the Question of Corporate Moral Agency, 1988 Colum.
Bus. L. Rev. 683, 695 (1988).
60. Joel
Seligman,
A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing: The American Law Institute
Principles of Corporate Governance Project, 55 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 325, 331 (1987).
61. Broc
Romanek
& Mark S. Britton, Online Shareholder Activism: How to Guard
Against its Fallout, 20 NO. 5 ACCA Docket 33, 38-39 (2002).
62. Id. at 34.
63. Id. at 37.
64. Sec. Exchange Act of
1934 § 13(d), 17
C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-1 (2006) (pursuant to beneficial ownership
reporting requirements in § 13(d) of the Sec. Exchange Act of
1934).
65. Romanek, supra note
61, at 37.
66. Id. at 36.
67. Id. at 37.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 38-39.
70. Romanek &
Britton, supra note 61, at 38-39.
71. Robert R. Ambler,
Jr., Postponing the Delaware Corporation's Annual Meeting, 38
Emory L.J. 207, 208 n.6 (1989).
72. Frederick
Schauer,
The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration
of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1779
(2004).
73. Sec. Exchange Act of
1934 §14(a), 17
C.F.R.
§ 240.14(a) (1988) (describing solicitation of proxies).
74. See Hannes, supra
note 32, at 78-79.
75. "Proxy cards for
corporate elections typically allow shareholders to check a box
authorizing the corporation to cast the shareholders' votes 'for'
the corporate nominees or to check a box marked 'withhold vote.'
They do not offer the option of voting 'no.' Indeed, in an
uncontested election, submitting a proxy card marked 'withhold
vote' is probably counterproductive, since its only effect is to
validate the election by helping to establish a quorum. Refusing
to return a proxy card at all might foil a quorum but could be
interpreted by management as indifference, rather than
opposition." Thomas
W.
Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of "Corporate Democracy":
Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 St. John's L.
Rev. 735, 745 n.47 (2003).
76. Erica
Laudano,
One Man's Junk Mail is Another Man's Treasure: Proxy Contests
and Corporate Governance, 3 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J. 430,
432-433 (2004).
77. Stephen
J.
Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher
Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 Yale L.J.
269, 300 (2003).
78. Id.
79. Joo, supra note 75,
at 744-45 (internal citations omitted).
80. Williams
v.
Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1384 (Del. 1996).
81. Id.
82. 97
F.
Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
83. 191
N.W.2d
406 (Minn. 1971).
84. Id.; contra Credit
Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Credit Bureau of St. Paul, Inc., 290
A.2d
691 (Del. 1972). See generally 50 A.L.R. 3d 1056 (noting the
stockholders right to "inspect corporate books or records in
pursuit of social or political interests").
85. Medical Comm. for
Human Rights v. SEC., 432
F.2d
659, 662-63 (D.C. Cir. 1970); SEC. v. Medical Comm. for
Human Rights, 404
U.S.
403, 406 (1972).
86. Medical Comm. for
Human Rights, 404 U.S. at 406.
87. Tucson Gas &
Electric Co. v. Schantz, 428
P.2d
686, 688-89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967).
88. Roger J. Magnuson,
Information: Coping with Corporate Secrecy, in 2 Shareholder
Litigation § 15:8 (2005).
89. Williams, supra
note 8, at 1284-85.
90. "[M]any
cases
have recognized the right of shareholders of a corporation at
common law to inspect all corporate books and records,
generally, although the right appears to be expressly or
impliedly limited to documents that are relevant to
shareholders' interests. Many jurisdictions have enacted
statutes which grant stockholders the right to inspect
particular books and records of the corporation. Under statutes
of this nature, it has been held, similar to the common law
rule, that shareholders have the right to inspect all books and
records of the corporation, although the right of inspection
appears to be explicitly or implicitly limited to documents that
are relevant to shareholders' interests." 88 A.L.R.3d 663,
§ 2(a).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 18
Am.
Jur. 2d Corporations § 339 (2006).
94. Wong Buck Kam v. Lee
Chee, 29
Haw.
508, 512 (1926).
95. Bank
of
Heflin v. Miles, 318 So. 2d 697, 700-01 (Ala. 1975).
96. Smith
v.
Flynn, 155 So. 2d 497, 504 (Ala. 1963).
97. Lehman v. National
Benefit Ins. Co., 53
N.W.2d
872, 873, 876 (Iowa 1952).
98. Friedman v. Altoona
Pipe & Steel Supply Co., 460
F.2d
1212, 1213 (3d Cir. 1972) (applying Pennsylvania law).
99. Otis-Hidden Co. v.
Scheirich, 219
S.W.
191, 194 (Ky. Ct. App. 1920).
100. Bank
of
Heflin, 318 So. 2d at 700.
101. News-Journal Corp.
v. State, 187
So.
271, 272 (Fla. 1939).
102. Morris v. United
Piece Dye Works, 59
A.2d
660, 661 (N.J. 1948).
103. State ex rel.
Lowell Wiper Supply Co. v. Helen Shop, Inc., 362
S.W.2d
787, 791-92 (Tenn. 1962).
104. Martin v. D. B.
Martin Co., 88
A.
612, 616 (Del. Ch. 1913).
105. See Guthrie v.
Harkness, 199
U.S.
148, 155 (1905) ("The right of inspection rests upon the
proposition that those in charge of the corporation are merely the
agents of the stockholders, who are the real owners of the
property" (citing Cincinnati Volksblatt Co. v. Hoffmeister, 56
N.E. 1033 (Ohio 1900)).
106. Randall S. Thomas,
Improving Shareholder Monitoring and
Corporate Management by Expanding Statutory Access to
Information, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 331, 335-36 n.24 (1996)
("While these two interests are conceptually distinct, they
overlap to such a great extent that the courts have frequently
treated them together"). See, e.g., Shaw v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663
A.2d 464, 467 (Del. 1995) ("[I]nspection rights have been viewed
as an incident to the stockholder's ownership of corporate
property.... As a matter of self-protection, the stockholder was
entitled to know how his agents were conducting the affairs of the
corporation of which he or she was a part owner")).
107. Clawson
v.
Clayton, 93 P. 729, 730 (Utah 1908).
108. Shaw v. Agri-Mark,
Inc., 67
F.3d
18, 19 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that the inspector must be a
shareholder of record) (citing Shaw v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d
464, 470 (Del. 1995)).
109. State ex rel.
Mandelker v. Mandelker, 222
N.W.
786, 787-88 (Wis. 1929); State ex rel. Dempsey v. Werra
Aluminum Foundry Co., 182
N.W.
354, 355 (Wis. 1921).
110. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 23B.16.020(4)
(West 1994 & Supp. 2006).
111. See Williams,
supra note 8, at 1199-1200.
112. Securities Act of
1934, ch. 2B, § 14(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(2000)).
113. See Williams,
supra note 8, at 1199-1200.
114. Id.
115. See id. at
1199-1200 ("The capital markets in the United States are
celebrated for their financial transparency. This financial
transparency derives primarily from the specific information about
operating results, presented using rigorous accounting principles,
that federal securities laws require public companies to report on
a quarterly and annual basis").
116. See Securities Act
of 1934, ch. 2B, §§ 12(a), 13(a) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78l(a), 78m(a) (2000)).
117. Id. § 12(g)(1)
(codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.
§ 78l(g)(1) (1994)); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2006).
118. Securities Act of
1934, ch. 2B, § 15(d) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)
(2000)).
119. Rachel
Cherington,
Securities Laws and Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward an
Expanded Use of Rule 10b-5, 25 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 1439,
1447-49 (2004).
120. Id. at 1447 (citing
15 U.S.C. §§ 13-14 (2004)).
121. Patricia
Romano,
Sustainable Development: A Strategy that Reflects the Effects of
Globalization on the International Power Structure, 23 Hous. J.
Int'l L. 91, 109 (2000) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(b)(1),
77j(c) (1994)).
122. Cyrus
Mehri,
Andrea Giampetro-Meyer & Michael B. Runnels, One Nation,
Indivisible: The Use of Diversity Report Cards to Promote
Transparency, Accountability, and Workplace Fairness, 9 Fordham
J. Corp. & Fin. L. 395, 422 (2004).
123. See, e.g.,
Regulation S-K [hereinafter Reg. S-K], 17
C.F.R.
§ 229.301 n.2 (2006); See also Regulation S-X [hereinafter
Reg. S-X], 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2006); Regulation S-B [hereinafter
Reg. S-B], 17 C.F.R. § 228 (2006).
124. Id.
125. See Reg. S-K, 17
C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(x) (2006).
126. Id. § 229.401-05.
127. Id. § 229.103.
128. Id § 229.303.
129. Id. § 229.101; see
also 17
C.F.R.
§ 229.103.
130. Stephen
F.
Diamond, The Petrochina Syndrome: Regulating Capital Markets in
the Anti-Globalization Era, 29 J. Corp. L. 39, 77 (2003)
("The SEC already requires companies to disclose details about
their environmental liabilities, potential problems related to
intellectual property, and relationships with employees. The SEC
long ago agreed to increase disclosure of so-called 'soft'
information, such as projections about the future course of a
company's business model").
131. Romano, supra note
121, at 110.
132. See Cherington,
supra note 119, at 1441, 1448.
133. See Williams,
supra note 8, at 1206.
134. Cherington, supra
note 119, at 1441-42.
135. SEC
Scrutinizing
Foreign Registrants Regarding Dealings in Countries Under U.S.
Sanctions, Prac. L. Inst. Order No. F0-00AN, at 81 (Dec.
2001) ("These include Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Cuba, and the
Taliban in Afghanistan. U.S. companies are prohibited from
engaging in any business activity in these countries. OFAC also
enforces other restrictions on certain business activities with
North Korea, Sierra Leone, Burma (Myanmar), Syria, the UNITA
faction in Angola, and specified parties in the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia").
136. See Note, Should
the SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements?, 115 Harv. L.
Rev. 1433, 1434-35 (2002).
137. David
Kinley
& Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human
Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law,
44 Va. J. Int'l L. 931, 949-50 (2004) (citing Organisation
[sic] of Economic Cooperation and Development, 15 I.L.M. 967
(1976) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines of 1976; International Labor
Organization: Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 17 I.L.M. 422 (1978)
[hereinafter Tripartite Declaration of 1977)).
138. Id. at 951.
139. AccountAbility,
AA1000
Series Standards, http://www.accountability.org.uk/aa1000/default.asp
(last visited **
Sept. 27, 2006).
140. Social
Accountability
International, SA8000 Standard, http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageID=710
(last visited **
Sept. 27, 2006).
141. Global
Reporting
Initiative, Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 2002, http://www.globalreporting.org/guidelines/062002guidelines.asp
(last visited **
Sept. 27, 2006).
142. Sonia
Gioseffi,
Corporate Accountability: Achieving Internal Self-Governance
through Sustainability Reports, 13 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
503, 524-25 (2004).
143. Id. at 504.
144. 15
U.S.C.
§ 7264 § 406 (2004). It provides, in pertinent part:
The Commission shall issue rules
to require each issuer, together with periodic reports required
pursuant to
section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, to disclose whether or not, and if not, the reason
therefor, such issuer has adopted a code of ethics for senior
financial officers.
(c) Definition. In this section,
the term "code of ethics" means such standards as are reasonably
necessary to promote --
(1) honest and ethical conduct,
including the ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts
of interest between personal and professional relationships;
(2) full, fair, accurate,
timely, and understandable disclosure in the periodic reports
required to be filed by the issuer; and
(3) compliance with applicable
governmental rules and regulations.
Id. Applicable governmental
rules and regulations could include human rights, environmental,
and labor law provisions. See also The Stakeholder Pension
Schemes Regulations, 2000 S.I. 2000/1403 P 9 (U.K.); Third
Swedish Pension Fund Annual Report 2001, 7, http://
www.ap3.se/en/Financial+reports/Index.htm;
Loi no 2001-152 du fèvrier 2001, Journal Officiel de la
République Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], 20
fèvrier 2001, p. 2774, 2779, available at http://
admi.net/jo/20010220/ECOX0000121L.html.
Art. 21 states:
The regulation makes precise, in
absence thereof, the social, environmental and ethical
considerations which the company must respect in management of
purchase or sale of securities as well as in the exercise of any
rights attached thereto. The annual report of the fund shall
declare their application according to conditions defined by the
Commission of Stock Market Operations. (Author's translation).
145. See Ilias
Bantekas,
Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 22 B.U.
Int'l L.J. 309, 337 (2004).
146. Gioseffi, supra
note 142, at 525; see also KPMG, International Survey on Corporate
Sustainability Reporting 5, 26-27 (2002), available at http://www.wimm.nl/publicaties/KPMG2002.pdf.
147. See Gioseffi, supra
note 142, at 524.
148. Mitchell F. Crusto,
Endangered Green Reports: "Cumulative
Materiality" in Corporate Environmental Disclosure after
Sarbanes-Oxley, 42 Harv. J. on Legis. 483, 483 (2005).
149. Gioseffi, supra
note 142, at 524.
150. Crusto, supra note
148, at 483.
151. Cherington, supra
note 119, at 1448.
152. Id. at 1449.
153. Securities Act of
1934, ch. 2B § 10 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
78(j)(b)(2000)). Section 10 prohibits:
[A]ny person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange
(b) To use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered... any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
154. 17
C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2006). Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.; see also Cherington, supra
note 119, at 1441 n.53.
155. See In
re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911-12 (1961) (
"Rule 10b-5 appl[ies] to securities transactions by 'any
person"'); see also Cherington, supra note 119, at 1449-50. In
addition to In re Cady, Cherington cites SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d
833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) ("holding that information regarding
potential mineral discovery was material"), Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425
U.S.
185, 193-94 (1976) ( "holding that intent to deceive is
necessary to sustain a Rule 10b-5 claim"), Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
485
U.S.
224, 243 (1988) ("noting that 'reliance is an element of a
Rule 10b-5 cause of action"') Cherington, supra note 119, at
1449-50 nn. 63, 65-66.
156. Cherington, supra
note 119, at 1450-51.
157. See Crusto, supra
note 148, at 497-98.
158. S.E.C., Staff
Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64
Fed.
Reg. 45150-01, 45151 (Aug. 19, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 211 (2000)). (It contains the most recent authoritative
literature on materiality: "[a] matter is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it
important.") Moreover, "[e]nvironmental risks and liabilities are
among the conditions that, if undisclosed, could impair the
public's ability to make sound investment decisions. For example,
the discovery of extensive hazardous waste contamination... [or]
impending environmental regulations could affect a company's
future financial position...." Crusto, supra note 148, at 498
(quoting Letter from John B. Stephenson, Director, National
Resources and the Enviorment, to Senator Jon S. Corzine (D.-N.J.)
(Aug. 4, 2004) (GAO-04-1019R)).
159. Cherington, supra
note 119, at 1449.
160. Letter from
Honorable John B. Stephenson, Ranking Minority Member, Committee
on Environment and Public Works, to Senator Jon S. Corzine
(D.-N.J.) (July 14, 2004) reprinted in GAO-04-808, Environmental
Disclosure: SEC Should Explore Ways to Improve Tracking and
Transparency of Information (2004) ( "Environmental risks and
liabilities are among the conditions that, if undisclosed, could
impair the public's ability to make sound investment decisions.
For example, the discovery of extensive hazardous waste
contamination... [or] impending environmental regulations could
affect a company's future financial position"). Id.
161. See, e.g., Black's
Law Dictionary 670 (7th ed. 1999).
162. Id. at 413.
163. 45
P.3d
243, 248 (Cal. 2002), cert. dismissed, 539
U.S.
654 (2003) (per curiam).
164. Cherington, supra
note 119, at 1446.
165. See, e.g., Kasky,
45 P.3d at 248.
166. Cherington, supra
note 119, at 1446.
167. Cherington, supra
note 119, at 1446.
168. See, e.g., Hemming
v. Alfin Fragrances, Inc., 690
F.
Supp. 239, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that advertising in
the New York Times Magazine, although widely distributed, was not
sufficient to establish the "in connection with" requirement for
Rule 10b-5 because it was aimed at consumers rather than
investors). But see In re Carter-Wallace Inc. Sec. Litig., 150
F.3d
153, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that advertisements in
medical journals may meet the "in connection with" requirement).
169. Charles Mark Holt,
B. Alford v. Shaw: North Carolina Adopts a Prophylactic Rule to
Prevent Termination of Shareholders' Derivative Suits through
Special Litigation Committees 64 N.C. L. Rev. 1228, 1228-29 n.1
(1985) ("A shareholders' derivative suit is an action brought by
one or more shareholders of a corporation to enforce a corporate
cause of action against officers, directors, or third parties"
(citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S.
531, 534 (1970)).
170. William W.
Schwarzer et al., California Practice Guide: Federal Civil
Procedure Before Trial ch. 2C-6.
171. Tooley v.
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845
A.2d
1031, 1033 (Del 2004).
172. Id. at 1036.
173. Id. at 1035.
174. Id. at 1036.
175. J. William Callison
& Maureen A. Sullivan, Partnership Law & Practice ch. 28
§ 28:1 (2004).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Robert E. Jones et
al., Rutter Group Practice Guide: Federal Civil Trials and
Evidence ch. 2-B § 2:60 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396
US
531, 532-533 (1970) ("The right to jury trial attaches to
those issues in derivative actions as to which the corporation, if
it had been suing in its own right, would have been entitled to a
jury")).
179. Hawes v. City of
Oakland, 104
U.S.
450, 460-61 (1882).
180. The universal rule
that a shareholder must exhaust intracorporate remedies before
bringing a derivative action is most often cited to. Id. at 460-62
(The rationale for the demand requirement derives from a
recognition of corporate managers' and directors' authority to
bring a corporation's cause of action and from goals of judicial
economy because many claims may be settled within the corporate
structure). See, e.g., Barr v. Wackman, 329
N.E.2d
180, 185-86 (1975) (board of directors can often correct
alleged abuses without resort to the courts.); see also Holt,
supra note 169, at 1229.
181. 19 William Meade
Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 5:04 (rev.
perm. ed. 1992 & Supp. 2006).
182. Id.
183. Deborah A. DeMott,
Shareholder Derivative Actions Law and practice. § 5:2 (1987
& Supp. 2006); but see Eye
Site,
Inc. v. Blackburn, 796 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1990).
184. Olga
N.
Sirodoeva-Paxson, Judicial Removal of Directors: Denial of
Directors' License to Steal or Shareholders' Freedom to Vote?,
50 Hastings L.J. 97, 140 (1988).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 151.
187. Daniel
S.
Kleinberger & Imanta Bergmanis, Direct vs. Derivative, or
"What's a Lawsuit Between Friends in an 'Incorporated
Partnership?"', 22 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1203, 1208 (1996).
188. Sirodoeva-Paxson,
supra note 184, at 151.
189. Kleinberger, supra
note 187, at 1208.
190. Sirodoeva-Paxson,
supra note 184, at 151.
191. See William L. Cary
& Melvin A. Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on Corporations
757-70 (6th ed. 1988); 2 James D. Cox et al., Corporations § 15.2
(1995).
192. See id.
193. Fed
R.
Civ. P. 23(1).
194. Fed
R.
Civ. P. 23(2).
195. Fed.
R.
Civ. P. 23(3).
196. Fed.
R.
Civ. P. 23(4).
197. Dubinsky, supra
note 3, at 1152 ("In the human rights class action, the tension
between individual claimants and the group as a whole can be
heightened").
198. See, e.g. Tylka
v.
Gerber Prods. Co, 178 F.R.D. 493, 497-98 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(narrowing the class definition after plaintiffs had failed to
show that the "nuances of 50 consumer fraud statutes" could be
manageably litigated in one suit).
199. Mejdrech v.
Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319
F.3d
910, 910-12 (7th Cir. 2003) (certifying class only with
respect to one common question of causation and refusing to
certify it with respect to individual claims of harm).
200. Dubinsky, supra
note 3, at 1187.
201. See, e.g. Cicippio
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18
F.
Supp. 2d 62, 69 (D.D.C. 1998); Nat'l
Coal.
Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329,
360 (C.D. Cal. 1997) ("equitable
tolling
is available where (1) defendant's wrongful conduct prevented
plaintiff from asserting the claim; or (2) extraordinary
circumstances outside the plaintiff's control made it impossible
to timely assert the claim").
202. Paul
R.
Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization: The
Coming Conflict, 30 Yale J. Int'l L. 211, 216 (2005).
203. Johnson, supra note
3, at 648.
204. Eric Allen Engle, The
Torture
Victim's Protection Act, the Alien Tort Claims Act, and
Foucault'sArchaeology of Knowledge. 67 Alb. L. Rev. 501, 501-25
(2003).
205. Eric Allen Engle, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction:
Can RICO Protect Human Rights? A Computer Analysis of a
Semi-Determinate Legal Question, 3 High Tech. L. J. 1 (2004)
available at http://www.jhtl.org/publications/V3N1/engle-lead%20article-PDF.pdf.