Citation:
Eric Allen Engle, The EU Means
Business: A Survey of Legal Challenges and Opportunities in
the New Europe,
4 DePaul Bus. & Com. L.J. 351 (2006).
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I. Introduction
A single market from
Brest to the Bering straights; An entire continent working in
peaceful harmony toward the greater prosperity of all. This vision
of Europe, at once practical in means and sweeping in scope, has
driven the economies of Western Europe forward since 30 years. Now
it is poised to drive the economies of Eastern Europe forward as
well. One can look on this engine of growth and prosperity with
hope or fear. But one cannot ignore it.
The single market in
Europe has grown gradually and pragmatically over time. The thesis
this article presents is just as practical. As others have also
argued,
1
a number of EC Directives, regulations and cases together create a
common European business law. This article surveys and outlines
that law. All of the various efforts at harmonization this law
embodies work toward creating a single integrated European market
in order to garner the benefits of improved competition and
synergies. Economic synergy is no idealist pipe dream. In
materialist terms, economies of scale,
2 specialization
3
at each stage of production, standardization of parts and services
4
and trade itself,
5 all result in a whole
that
*352 is in real terms far wealthier than
the sum of its parts. Synergies resulting from European
integration are estimated to bring at least an additional five
billion euros of wealth to the European economy.
6
These economic facts
have political implications. This article uses them to partially
test a much larger hypothesis: The EU does not represent a
misguided effort at neo-mercantilism. ASEAN, MERCOSUR, NAFTA and
the EU are not competing continental empires doomed like the
empires of 1914 and 1940 to mutual destruction because they are
part of a global liberal trading regime under the aegis of the
WTO.
7
Rather, the economic policies of the European Community
(Community), like those of the other mentioned interstate
organizations, are founded on the presumptions of classical
economic liberalism: That individuals should be able to make their
own choices,
8 that open markets are
economically optimal,
9 that the state has a
limited role as market regulator
10 and that trade
encourages peace and prosperity
11 because it is a
positive sum game
12 - even in cases where
trading parties are asymmetric and one has an absolute advantage
in production of all goods.
13 These assumptions
propelled America from wilderness to world power and have
preserved peace since 1945. Rather than recreate the failed
imperialist models of the past, the very object of the EU, the
WTO, and the Bretton Woods institutions
14 is to sever the link
between territorial control and market
*353 share which caused two world wars.
15
Although the EU seeks to create autarchy in food production,
16
it is constantly imbricated into the liberal world trade regime of
the WTO and the security regime of NATO. Autarchy is unprofitable
and the only security is collective security.
Not only is the EU no
threat to U.S. interests it is in fact an opportunity for American
business. As the late President Kennedy said "[W]e don't regard a
strong, united Europe as a rival, but as a partner."
17
Europe is good for business. Even if the increased productivity of
the EU costs the U.S. relative market share in certain sectors so
what? To put the point extremely: Who cares if you lose half your
market share if at the same time you triple your income? That very
roughly is what has happened to the U.S. since 1945. A massive
increase in absolute wealth coupled with relative decline is the
result of trading synergies. In short, the illusion of failure
(relative decline in economic power) is built in to the reality of
success (absolute increase in real wealth resulting from the above
described synergies). In fact, the U.S. has been in relative
economic decline since 1945. It has seen its share of world
production decline from nearly 50% of a planet devastated by
global war to just under 20% in a world of abundance.
18
Does anyone seriously think that the U.S. was not in real terms
much better in 2005 than it was in 1945?
19
A cursory examination of life expectancy proves the point.
Prosperity makes war irrelevant.
National security
arguments against complacency in the face of relative decline
ignore the obvious fact that nuclear weapons make war, already
irrelvant
20
because it destroys productive capacity, unthinkable:
21
"Conventional" war is also irrelevant. Just look at Iraq for the
most
*354 recent example of the failure of war
to advance economic policy. Moreover, threats to the U.S. and the
world today are either from non-state actors such as insurgents
22
or from cross border environmental issues.
23
Conventional armies are ill adapted to meet either of these
threats.
24
From all this follows that the state-centric
Realpolitik neoconservative
25
view of the national security state is dangerous and unrealistic
because of the destructive power of nuclear weapons and irrelevant
because military power does not create economic wealth.
26
An interdependent global marketplace has made the realist
neoconservative view of the statepointless.
27
There is a much richer, more interesting and brighter world of
commerce to be won.
To understand the
construction of Europe as one pole in a world order based on
liberalism we need to assess the methods of its construction,
ontology, goals, and teleology.
A. The Ontology of the Union--Functionalism
28
The ontology of the EU
is pragmatic. The Union was built up gradually on the basis of
functionalist theory.
29 Functionalism is the
idea that economic integration is best achieved not at one fell
swoop with grandiose
*355 and impossible ideas.
30
Rather, functionalism takes a pragmatic approach: it seeks to
attain the possible, here and now, rather than the perfect, maybe
someday.
31
Functionalist methods obtain political legitimacy after the fact
because of the success of the institution at achieving practical
goals.
32
No one complains about success.
Functionalist theory has
successfully
33 drawn Europe from a
Community of six nations jointly developing coal and steel
resources into a 25 nation Union constituting the world's largest
free trading area.
34 Functionalism has not
however created a Federal Europe.
35 This is because its
legitimacy is always ex post. Functionalism may build an economic
union, but political union requires direct democratic input in
concert with a clear political will. This is one more reason even
the most defensive minded Americans should not fear Europe.
B. The Teleology of the Union--Liberalism
The teleology of the
Union is a single market destined to create the conditions of
prosperity necessary to enable people to live what Aristotle
*356 called "the good life" ,
36
a life of well being, culture and fullest development and
expression of the human spirt. A certain degree of wealth is a
necessary condition to enjoying the good life, but wealth itself
is not the end of the good life.
37
In practical terms, this
teleology expresses itself most recently through efforts toward
privatization and deregulation.
38 In the 1980s and 1990s
a consensus emerged in the west that private ownership of the
means of production was more efficient than public ownership.
Thus, state owned enterprises such as rails, telecommunications
and post offices throughout Europe have been privatized and listed
on stock exchanges. An immediate practical reason for this may be
due to budget deficits.
39
The goal of economic
integration is attained through harmonization Directives,
regulations and case law of the EU. EU securities regulation
harmonization efforts aim to remove technical barriers that create
transaction costs or prevent entry into markets to create a single
market that clears as efficiently as possible.
40
This is done in order to create an integrated securities market.
The creation of a single European capital market is a major goal
of the European project.
41 The single
*357 capital market is intended to enhance
international economic well being and to avoid economic crises.
42
Europe is an agent of stable growth and thus is an opportunity for
prosperity even for Europe's trading partners.
With this understanding
of the means and ends of the European Union this article will now
turn to the legal instruments used to attain the single market in
labor, capital, goods and services. The article's focus will
accordingly shift from grand political issues at the macro level
to the practical legal mechanisms people build on the basis of
those beliefs. Specifically, it surveys EU securities law, tax law
and company law as these are at once economically interesting and
useful vectors to examine the process of European integration.
II. European Securities Law
Comparisons of EC
securities law and U.S. Securities law are inevitable and
desirable. The two systems are very similar, though the EC System
appears at once less centralized and to define its basic terms
more completely. Parallels can also be seen in the federal
structure. Each federated state in the U.S. is a sovereign,
43
as is true of the Member States of the EU.
44
The U.S. federal government
45 and the EU both
exercise supreme
46 yet limited powers.
47
At the same time, each has a certain flexibility.
48
*358 Because of these facts of federalism,
the implementation and enforcement of securities law in the
European Union is found in the national law of the Member States.
At the same time, the goals and direction of EU Securities law are
found in the Directives, regulations and decisions of the Union.
Member States retain the powers of regulating their stock markets
subject however to their obligations under the EC and EU treaties.
Thus, for example, procedure and practice to determine whether an
instrument is a security subject to regulation are essentially
found in national law
49 though the substantive
definitions of securities are now included in the community
Directives themselves. Directives are implemented and enforced by
the national law of the the Member States which to some extent
determine their content, particularly where the Member States
exercise their option to offer greater protections than the
minimum standards determined by the EC.
50
The policy goals of EC
securities law are to protect investors, to assure the proper
functioning of the securities market (capital formation and
allocation) and to attain uniform minimal standards throughout the
communities.
51 This implies the
necessity of investor confidence in the stability and security of
the market. These goals run throughout European business law and
can be seen just about anywhere in EC law one chooses to look.
U.S. securities lawyers would immediately recognize them:
52
Investor confidence in the integrity of the market is protected in
order to assure adequate capital formation; and Market
manipulations are prohibited in order to assure proper capital
allocation. The ends of EU securities law look similar to those
seen in U.S. securities law, however, the means used to attain
those ends are at times different. To attain the goals of a stable
and secure single capital market, the EU uses Directives,
principally, and conventions and regulations secondarily. These
instruments are in turn applied, interpreted or woven into the
judgements of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
Directives are proposed
by the European Commission and enacted or rejected by the Council
and if accepted become part of Community law.
*359 53 Directives address the
Member States and present binding guidelines for legislation to be
implemented by the Member States.
54 If a Member State does
not introduce legislation to transpose the Directive into national
law then the Commission can force it to do so using Article 226
(ex article 169).
55 Likewise, other Member
States can force the non-compliant Member State to act using
Article 227 (ex article 170).
56 Further, individuals
may also be able to enforce the Directive. As a general rule,
however, Directives do not create rights enforceable by
individuals
57 because the addressee
of Directives are the Member States. For a provision of a
Directive, regulation, or a Treaty article to be directly
effective to create directly enforceable rights and duties
inhering in individuals the provision of law must be clear,
precise and unconditional.
58 However,
non-implementation of a Directive may also lead to a the Directive
having direct effect, conferring rights and duties on individuals.
59
The various Directives
build bridges between the Member States on the basis of their
national laws. As can be seen from the above description, there is
no real equivalent to Directives in U.S. legislation. It would be
as if congress ordered states to enact a law, but left the means
to do so up to the states. The closest analogy to Directives in
U.S. law are the enabling acts of administrative law which
delegate authority from congress to an agency to implement
policies. But the Directives are much more specific than enabling
acts. The directives do not address the creation of an agency with
delegated powers. Rather the directives address the Member States
who must implement their provisions by enacting laws. So the
analogy is at best partial, but at least gives some sense of how
Directives work to a U.S. jurist.
Regulations are the
other tool used by the EU to unify European law. Regulations are
binding rules issued by the Commission.
60 They are
*360 self executing and have direct effect
in the national legal systems of the Member States. They are
legislation, but legislation made, in essence, by appointed
representatives. For this reason Regulations are very indirectly
democratic. They are made by political appointees who were
appointed by elected representatives. It's democracy - but not as
we know it.
In some ways the EU
legislative process is more centralized than in the U.S. Congress
does not order the states to enact legislation, but that is just
what a European Directive does to Member States. But in most ways
the EU is less centralized than the U.S. For example, Directives
generally leave open how Member States are to implement them.
Still, the EU constitutes a confederation of the Member States as
there is a customs union, a common commercial and agricultural
policy and a common currency and border control system, at least
as to the core Member States and finally because the EC and by
Extension the EU have international legal personality.
A. Company Law Directives
The exact legal basis of
EU base securities law is a threshold question. The very purpose
of the Union is to create a single market in labor capital goods
and services. Yet, these goals are subject to the constraints of
subsidiarity:
61 The Union should only
act when the end cannot be attained by the Member States working
individually. However, because of the doctrine of supremacy,
wherever the Union has competence it essentially has exclusive
competence.
62 Though securities law
is currently an area of shared competence, the doctrine of
supremacy could be used by the EU to justify replacing the
business laws of the Member States with EU law.
63
An argument against Community jurisdiction on the basis of
subsidiarity
64 would likely fail, all
the more so because of Art. 308 of the Amsterdam Treaty.
65
*361 The EU's business law Directives seek
to create uniform minimum standards throughout the community.
Harmonization of company law started with modest but generally
applicable Directives issued pursuant to under Article 94 (ex
article 100) of the EC Treaty
66 for the harmonization
of laws of the Member States directly affecting the common market.
The fields covered by Directives have, consistent with
functionalist method, grown constantly over time. Though
harmonization does not create a truly uniform law it does lay the
groundwork for eventual unification of EU securities law. What do
the existing laws look like?
1. Company Law
Directives The First Company law Directive
67
obliges limited liability companies and limited partnerships to
register their constitutive documents and requires them to provide
an annual financial report.
68 The Second Company law
Directive
69
imposes minimum capitalization requirements and minimal disclosure
requirements for public limited companies (corporations) as well
as limiting corporate restructuring and protects minority
shareholders from abuse; Derogations from the rules are possible
where such will encourage employee ownership of the company.
70
The Third Company Law Directive
71 harmonizes laws
regarding interstate mergers of publicly traded companies and
includes rules for disclosure and to protect employees and
creditors.
The Fourth Company Law
Directive
72
sets out minimum financial statement and auditing requirements;
Smaller companies can provide summary financial statements.
73
Acquisitions of companies involving a sale of assets for shares
are covered in the Sixth Company Law Directive
74
which requires publication of the fusion plan, shareholder
approval for the sale, and sets out the required information to be
published.
75 Information which must
be published in company financial statements is also addressed in
the Seventh Company Law Directive.
76 The Eighth Company Law
Directive requires financial statements to be
*362 audited by qualified auditors, and
sets out minimum educational and professional requirements of
auditors.
77
2. The New Prospectus
Directive
78
In 2003 the EC issued a
new Directive "On the Prospectus to be Published when Securities
are Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading" which amended
Directive 2001/34/EC.
79 The new prospectus
Directive was also accompanied by a regulation implementing it
which specifies exactly the information to be listed in the
prospectus.
80 The 2003 Directive
grouped together
81 the Listing Particulars
Directive,
82 and the Public Offer
Prospectus Directive
83 and refers to both to
define its contours. At the same time, it amended Directive
2001/34. Directive 2001/34 for its part grouped the Listing
Admission Directive,
84 the Interim Reports
Directive,
85 the Major Shareholdings
Directive
86
into one Directive and referred to those prior Directives to
define its scope.
87 Thus to understand
Directives 2003/71 and 2001/34, we must be aware of the prior
Directives. Specifically, 1) references to the provisions of the
repealed Directives are included in the new Directive.
88
The new Directives essentially regroup and refine the earlier
Directives. 2) The original Directives were transposed into
national law and thus may be relevant to understanding national
law. 3) The interpretation of Directive 2003/71 or of 2001/34 may
turn on how the prior Directives were interpreted. The prior
Directives may be persuasive evidence
*363 of the meaning of current Directives,
especially where the later Directive refers explicitly to its
predecessor.
89
3. Public Offerings of
Exchange-Listed Securities
a. The Listing Admission
Directive
The Listing Admissions
Directive determined conditions for listing securities issued by
one Member State on the stock exchanges of other Member States.
The goal of the Listing Admissions Directive, like the new
prospectus Directive (2003/71)
90, was to protect
investors by assuring adequate capitalization of companies
91
and to build the single capital market by integrating securities
law.
92
In essence, admission to the stock market of one Member State
permits the admitted security to be traded on the stock market of
another Member State as well.
93 To protect investors
the Listing Admissions Directive
94 required companies to
report material information which may affect the price of the
security
95
as does Directive 2003/71.
96 The earlier Directive
also required companies to be adequately capitalized as does
Directive 2001/34.
97 Offered securities must
be freely and fully negotiable
98 and a market for the
securities must in fact exist.
99
Financial information
such as balance statements (annual reports) must be published and
disseminated by widely distributed newspapers both in the earlier
Directive
100 and in Directives
2003/71
101
and 2001/34.
102
*364 b. The Listing Particulars Directive
The Listing Particulars
Directive covered securities which are "the subject of an
application for admission to official listing on a stock exchange
situated or operating within a Member State."
103
The Directive required issuers of a security to issue their
securities on the stock market of their home state (their state of
registration) if they will issue securities in any other state.
104
It also required disclosure of information "necessary to enable
investors . . . to make an informed assessment of the assets and
liabilities, financial position, profits and losses, and prospects
of the issuer and of the rights attaching to such securities."
105
including information about the issuer, the security,
capitalization, activities of the company, and its management team
as well as recent events and current prospects.
106
Exactly this language is retained in Directive 2003/71.
107
These mandatory disclosures are minima. Member States could
require greater disclosure.
108 The earlier Directive
109
and its successor 2003/71 do not define what sanction Member
States are to impose, leaving the determination of the exact
contours of sanctions to Member States.
110
Listing particulars
serve two functions: They provide initial information to secondary
markets
111
and are the basis of the prospectus for the public offering.
112
The requirements of the prospectus were set out in the Listing
Particulars Directive.
113 The listing
particulars requirements have been taken up in Directive 2001/34.
Though there are
practical limits to how effective harmonization can be in creating
a unified legal system, the Listing Particulars Directive extended
the EC's "philosophy of disclosure" .
114 The EC correctly
recognized that "it could not immediately replace the entire field
of securities regulation despite the primacy of EC law over
national law in areas covered by the Treaty of Rome."
115
Rather than trying to achieve an impossible ideal, the EC instead
opted for what ispossible
*365 but imperfect: Gradual but
irreversible progress towards the goal of a single market. The
functionalist foundations of the process of economic integration
are once again shown in practice.
c. The Interim Reports
Directive
The Interim Reports
Directive obligated companies which issue equities on Member State
stock exchanges to also provide semi-annual balance sheets
116
in order to allow investors to make informed decisions about
whether to purchase the security.
117 2001/34 in contrast
appears to require only annual reporting.
118
The Interim Reports Directive requires the company to publish the
information so that the public can obtain it and transmit the
information to the competent authorities in each Member State
where the security is sold.
119 Again, the goal of
the Directive is an integrated single capital market
120
as is the case of the successor Directives. There is still no
common accounting standard such as GAAP or IAS valid throughout
the EU.
121
And that fact, along with language barriers, is one of the greater
limits on EU business integration.
122 In sum however, the
various securities Directives are all aimed at transparency and
market integration and are rational instruments developed to
further desirable goals.
d. The Major
Shareholdings Directive ("Anti-raiders" Directive) The Major
Shareholdings Directive requires a person who acquires or disposes
of a certain percentage of shares in a company (10%, 20%, 33 1/3%,
50% and 66 2/3%) to give notice to the company and the public
authorities responsable for stock market regulation.
123
It was incorporated into Directive 2001/34 as articles 85-97 and
also in articles 102-110 of that Directive.
124
This transparency is intended to increase shareholder protection
and assure investor confidence resulting in more efficient
markets.
125 The Major
Shareholdings Directive is similar to SEC disclosure rules.
126
SEC Rule 13d-1
127 is triggeredwhen
*366 a shareholder, or group of
shareholders, acquires more than 5 percent of a company's stock.
128
13d imposes a filing obligation on the shareholders.
129
However the primary objective of most other SEC disclosure rules
130
is to protect ordinary investors by signaling them of purchases
and sales by large shareholders
131 as an indirect check
on insider trading whereas the Major Shareholdings Directive
focuses on maintaining a stable market. It is a question whether
trades made by large investors are observed because of inside
information or whether they are observed because of hostile
takeovers. Since disclosure is a low cost remedy, in fact both
reasons justify requiring large shareholders to signal their
purchases and sales.
The New Prospectus
Directive essentially governs the conditions under which the
securities issued by a company incorporated in one Member State
will be admitted to the stock market and to the stock markets of
other Member States. The ultimate objective of the Directive is to
create a system of mutual recognition to reduce transaction costs
associated with listing shares on other stock markets in the EU in
order to attain an integrated capital market.
132
To obtain that objective, investors have to know that the market
is fair. Thus, a second objective of the Directive is protection
of investors
133 via disclosure rules.
Full disclosure should thus help improve capital formation and
allocation.
134 Protection of
investors and the creation of an integrated capital market are
complementary goals the Directive seeks to attain so that European
securities can compete on the global market.
135
*367 Accordingly, the New Prospectus
Directive imposes on Member States a duty to require companies
seeking to make public offerings of their securities to present a
prospectus detailing financial and management information about
the company and its shares for any security offered to the public
within the territory of a Member State.
136
The Directive creates minimum uniform disclosure standards
throughout the community for public offerings of securities,
irrespective of whether those securities are listed or unlisted.
137
Listing particulars can be used throughout the EC interchangeably
138
which should help to build the integrated capital market. The
earlier Prospectus Directive was "a first step towards a Community
prospectus"
139 which the new
directive fulfills.
Like the SEC
registration requirements for publicly traded securities, the
prospectus Directive does not apply to certain limited offerings.
These include offerings to a "restricted circle of persons," or to
"persons in the context of their trades, professions or
occupations" . Small offerings are also exempt
140
as are offerings arising out of mergers and acquisitions
141
and intercompany compensation of employees or management.
142
Similar exemptions for small offerings to experienced investors
143
and a qualified investor exemption appears in the New Prospectus
Directive as well.
144 These are similar to
the exceptions to the prospectus requirements of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, which exempts small offerings
to qualified investors from filing with the SEC.
145
Member States must in
principle grant reciprocal recognition to those issuers who have a
registered office in that Member State
146 The Member State
which must recognize the registration may not generally require
more information than the other Member State requires
147
with the exception of relevant local information, in particular
regarding the Member State's tax system.
148
The Directive permits Member States to limit the reciprocity
requirement to issuers having their
*368 registered offices in a Member State
149
as does the successor 2001/34
150
In conclusion, the
securities Directives "demonstrate the principles of minimum
standards, mutual recognition and home country control that are
basic tenets of the single market in securities."
151
There are however some practical limits on the effectiveness of
the Directives. Understandably, stock exchanges insist on a
translation of listing particulars and often place further
requirements on foreign issuers wishing to list on their exchange.
152
Nevertheless, the Directives do move Europe toward the goal of a
single integrated market.
4. The Insider Trading
Directive
Insider trading law
shows the influence of the EC on the Member States law most
clearly. Prior to the Insider Trading Directive, insider trading
was treated differently in each Member State, being a criminal
offense in some states, yet perfectly legal in others.
153
Here, the EC has acted to create a Community standard and today
insider trading is regarded as wrongful throughout the EU.
The first community
prohibition of insider trading was the 1989 Directive.
154
This Directive has since been replaced by a more comprehensive
Directive
155 which covers shares
and a variety of option contracts as well as prohibiting market
manipulation. Market manipulation is defined as trading or
disseminating information in order to give false or misleading
signals as to price movements.
156 Again, the directive
is more specific about defining market manipulation than
Securities Exchange Act (SEA) Section 10b, which prohibits "any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" .
157
This might be because the SEA was enacted in the wake of the
greatest stock market crash in history, whereas the directives
were not. The 2003 Directive covers shares, unit trusts, money
markets instruments, futures, swaps, options, derivatives and any
other instrument trading on a regulated
*369 market or for which a request to
trade has been made.
158 Once again the terms
are more specific than the 1933 and 1934 acts which defines
security very broadly
159 - so broadly in fact
that even investments in a common ponzi scheme have been held to
be a security.
160 The basic premises of
the 1989 Directive are retained within the 2003 Directive and the
1989 Directive may be persuasive evidence of the meaning of the
2003 Directive.
a. Rationale of the
Insider Trading Directive
The EC takes the
position that insider trading undermines investor confidence,
161
which leads to sub-optimal clearing of securities markets.
162
These rationales of the 1989 Directive are also found in the 2003
Directive.
163 They are essentially
the same rationales for the prohibition
*370 of insider trading that one sees in
U.S. law.
164 But, unlike the U.S.,
at the time of the adoption of the Insider Trading Directive,
insider trading was by no means a criminal offense in all or even
a majority of Member States.
165 The Directive seeks
to improve protection against abuse throughout the community.
The Directive
essentially shifted the focus on insider trading from "pure
company law" which juxtaposed the company's interest against the
insiders based on a rationale that insider trading is a breach of
fiduciary duty to a multilateral approach. Under the modern
multilateral approach, stockholders, employees, managers, and the
general public are seen as having competing interests to be
balanced and the rationale for the prohibition of insider trading
is to maintain market efficiency.
166 The basis of the
Directive is not in Art. 54 of the Treaty of Rome but in Art. 100a
of the Single European Act.
167
The 1989 predecessor
Directive clearly defined the term "insider", unlike U.S. law,
where the term is not statutorily defined. An insider is one who,
due to his relationship to the company as manager, director,
employee or major shareholder, possesses inside information
(material non-public facts) and knowingly uses such inside
information to acquire or dispose of securities to which the
information relates for his own account or another.
168
The 2003 Directive not only directs the prohibition to persons who
acquired inside information due to their position as a director,
manager, employee or majority shareholder but includes those who
acquired the information illegally.
169
*371 The 1989 Directive prohibited insiders
from "tipping" others about inside information except in the
course of ordinary business.
170 The prohibition of
"tipping" ,
171 as well as the
exception for trades in the ordinary course of business are also
found in the Directive 2003/6.
172 "Tipping", a source
of controversy and uncertainty in U.S. securities law, is more
clearly defined in E.U. law than in U.S. law
173
as are the instances where "tipping" is permitted. The "safe
harbor" provisions allowing disclosure of inside information in
the ordinary course of employment ("tipping") are, as an exception
to a general rule, to be interpreted strictly.
174
Thus, disclosure of inside information in the course of employment
is also prohibited unless "there is a close link between the
disclosure and the exercise of his employment, profession or
duties, and that disclosure is strictly necessary for the exercise
of that employment, profession or duties."
175
That is, disclosure of inside information in the course of
employment will be seen as rightful "only if it is strictly
necessary for the exercise of an employment, profession or duties
and complies with the principle of proportionality."
176
The court will examine the quality of the disclosed information to
determine whether the disclosure was, given the actual facts of
the case, necessary.
177 One could thus
predict a correlation between the impact of information on prices
inversely to the probability that the information rightfully
disclosed. In all events, the judicial interpretations of the
meaning of the earlier Directive very likely apply to the
successor Directive.
*372 c. Inside Information Defined
The 1989 Directive and
its 2003 successor clearly define "inside information" .
178
This is not the case in U.S. law: Just as "insider" is not clearly
defined in U.S. law
179 so also is "inside
information" undefined in the relevant SEC legislation and
regulations.
180 In U.S. law the
concepts, presumptions and rationales for the prohibition of
insider trading are amorphous at best, conflicting at worst. The
theoretical situation is better in Europe because the basic terms
of the law are clearer.
What is inside
information? The 1989 Directive defined inside information as
"information which is unknown to the public of a specific nature
and relating to one or more issuers of transferable securities, or
to one or more transferable securities, which, if it were
published, would be likely to have a material effect on the price
of the transferable security or transferable securities in
question."
181 The 2003 Directive
similarly provides that: "'Inside information' shall mean
information of a precise nature which has not been made public,
ralating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of
financial instruments or to one or more financial instruments and
which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a
significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or
on the price of related derivative financial instruments."
182
The European
Directive's definition of insider trading is clearer than the U.S.
definition. However, the same elements arise in both legal
systems: Materiality and Publicity ("material non-public
information").
183 However, "[U]nlike
the U.S. insider trading laws, determination of illegal trading is
based not on breach of a fiduciary duty, but rather, on possession
of non-public information."
184 That is, both the
rationale and definition of prohibited conduct are clearer in the
EU than in the U.S.
*373 d. Prohibition of Insider Trading
The text of the 1989
Directive and the 2003 Directive are similar so we can expect that
interpretations of the 1989 text would be likely to apply to the
2003 text. The 1989 Directive orders Member States to forbid:
. . . any
person who . . . has access to such information by virtue of the
exercise of his employment, profession or duties, possesses inside
information from taking advantage of that information . . . by
acquiring or disposing of for his own account or for the account
of a third party, either directly or indirectly, transferable
securities of the issue or issuers to which that information
relates.
185
And its successor
version in 2003 says:
Member
States shall prohibit any person referred to in the second
subparagraph who possesses inside information from using that
information by acquiring or disposing of, or by trying to acquire
or dispose of, for his own account or for the account of a third
party, either directly or indirectly, financial instruments to
which that information relates.
186
Thus, rather than
seeing the 2003 Directive as displacing case law and legislation
developed under the 1989 Directive we should expect to see the
courts interpreting the 2003 Directive in light of the 1989
Directive and its attendant case law.
e. Prohibition of
Market Manipulation
Unlike the 1989
Directive, the 2003 Directive prohibits market manipulation.
Market manipulation is clearly defined as transactions which give
false or misleading signals to the market as to supply and demand
or which fix the price of a given issue at an abnormal or
artificial level.
187 Art. 2(b) of the
Market Abuse Directive uses language quite similar to SEA Section
10, including in market manipulation: "transactions or orders to
trade which employ fictitious devices or any other form of
deception or contrivance;"
188 Subsection 2(c) goes
on to list some possible manipulative devices, such as internet
rumor mongering. That list is of course not exhaustive.
f. Sanctions for
market abuse
Both the 1989 and 2003
inside trading Directives require Member States to enact sanctions
for insider trading but do not define what they
*374 may be.
189 Thus a Member State
could punish insider trading as a crime or a tort or both. This
shows that Directives permit a flexible and nuanced response to
the problems posed by the construction of the single market, all
the more so when we remember that Directives generally establish
minimum standards which Member States can exceed.
190
5. The Financial
Instruments Directive
The Investment
Services Directive (ISD) was adopted in order to foster the
formation of a single continental capital market pursuant to art.
57 of the Treaty of Rome.
191 It has since been
modified by the Directive on financial instruments.
192
References to the ISD are now construed to refer to the Financial
Instruments Directive.
193 The Financial
Instruments Directive
194 establishes minimum
standards throughout the community and to provide mutual
recognition of Member State business entities.
195
Mutual recognition enables a company registered in one Member
State to do business anywhere in the community without
re-registering.
196 The obverse of a
single market is prevention of protectionism: As seen in
Commission v. Italy,
197 the single market for
financial services implies an opposition to any form of
intra-community protectionism, whether in goods, services, or
movement of capital and labor.
The Financial
Instruments Directive applies to investment firms and regulated
markets generally.
198 Insurance companies,
"in house" asset managers and certain pension funds are not
covered.
199 The Directive sets
out minimum capital requirements for financial services companies
200
as well as requires the maintenance of an office in the country
where it will do business to assure the expertise and reputability
as a financial services provider.
201 Disclosure and
transparency requirements
*375 are also a part of the Directive.
202
Service providers are obligated to execute trades on terms most
favorable to their clients.
203
6. Life Insurance
Directives
The Third Life
Directives
204 permits cross border
life insurance business "but has accomplished little with regard
to liberalizing cross border securities investment."
205
However it too demonstrates the will to create an integrated
financial services market.
7. Mutual Funds
Directive (UCIT)
206
Undertakings for the
Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS), better
known in American English as mutual funds,
207
or in Britain as PEPs, are investment companies that makes money
buy purchasing and selling shares in other companies. According to
the UCITS Directive such funds "may be constituted according to
the law of contract (as common funds managed by management
companies) or trust law (as unit trusts) or under statute (as
investment companies)."
208 The UCITS must be
authorized in the Member State where they do business
209
but once authorized may do business anywhere in the Union.
210
UCITS may only invest in securities listed in a Member State or
approved regulated foreign markets. UCITS may not borrow funds and
must be able to redeem units of shareholders when asked to do so.
211
UCITS are regulated by the state of incorporation though the
marketing of UCITS units are subject to the marketing laws of the
host state.
212
*376 9. Banking Directive
213
The Second
Banking Directive establishes a single license applicable
throughout the EU for the provision of banking and other financial
services. Banks operating under the Second Banking Directive may
provide a wide variety of financial services, including investment
services, authorized by the home Member State, without obtaining
an additional license.
214
There are practical
limits on the use of Directives to achieve legal harmonization. As
mentioned earlier, Directives are not generally directly
applicable. A Directive may however have direct effect if "(i) the
obligations are clear and unambiguous, (ii) they are unconditional
and (iii) their operation is not dependent on further action by
the community" .
215
Because the Directive
must be implemented seperately in each Member State there is a
risk of conflicting interpretations and more seriously of
duplicated effort. Further, Directives are the result of
compromises and thus may be conflicted, yet at the same time are a
bit inflexible and are difficult to amend.
216
However Directives are effective at encouraging creation of
community wide minimum standards. Though imperfect, Directives do
work generally speaking. Moreover, Directives build the consensus
necessary for legitimate market integration. Other mechanisms for
harmonization of law do exist, namely conventions and regulations,
which we now examine.
B. Conventions: The Insider Trading Convention
Article 293 (ex art.
220) ECT obliges the Member States to negotiate among themselves
to abolish double taxation in the Community. Unlike Directives,
conventions are not a part of Community law.
217
Community institutions are not necessarily at all involved in the
conclusion of an international convention, even one made pursuant
to Art. 293 ECT.
Directives are
generally not directly applicable and do not create rights
enforceable by individuals. Likewise, though an international
convention
*377 might be directly applicable, the
better view is that international conventions are presumed not to
create directly enforceable individual rights and duties unless
they explicitly otherwise affirm.
There is at least one
tax convention made pursuant to Art. 293 ECT: The Transfer Pricing
Arbitration Convention.
218 The Transfer Pricing
Arbitration Convention provides a mechanism for Member States to
arbitrate their disputes regarding double taxation of a business
which transfers profits from operations in one Member State to
another. There is also a convention addressing insider trading.
The insider trading convention
219 seeks to create
mutual assistance mechanisms for the exchange of information. The
insider trading convention defines an insider as a director,
officer, board member or their agent. Inside information is
defined as non-public information obtained from the insider's
employment and which if disclosed would be likely to have a
significant influence on the stock market.
220
State parties are obligated to exchange information about
suspected inside trading.
221
C. Regulations: The Council Regulation for a European Economic
Interest Grouping
Another tool for
harmonization of community law is the regulation. Unlike
Directives, regulations are immediately effective:
222
They do not require any national legislation to be implemented.
Because regulations are binding law throughout the entire
community it is more difficult to enact regulations than
Directives and this limits their use.
The EEIG Regulation
creates the European Economic Interest Group
223
(EEIG). The EEIG is essentially an institutional form for joint
venture partnerships between two or more companies, whether public
or private. The contract concluded does not create a legal person
independent of the partners to the EEIG, though the EEIG can enter
into contracts in its own name.
224 Though the EEIG must
register in the Member State where it is domiciled, it is governed
by EU law.
*378 225 Like any joint
venture partnership, the parties to an EEIG do not enjoy limited
liability, though this drawback as far as tort liability may also
be an advantage as far as lenders are concerned since either
partner would be responsible for the debts of the partnership.
Article 308 ECT (ex art. 235) is the basis of the EEIG.
226
D. Comparison
1. Comparison of EU
and U.S. Securities Law
There are some
similarities but also differences between the regime mandated by
the Directive and U.S. securities law. SEA Section 10
227
and Regulation 10b(5)
228 prohibit trading on
material non-public information,
229 like the Directive.
However it is unclear whether Section 10b is based on a theory of
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud on the market, misappropriation of
information, or any or all of these theories. It is just as
unclear to whom duties are owed. In contrast the Directive is
clear that it is based not on breach of fiduciary duty but on
possession of material non-public information. Courts interpreting
SEA Section 10b and Regulation 10b(5)
230 find an implied
private right of action.
231 The Directive does
not provide for any private right of action. Once again, there is
much less chaos in the European legislation. Unlike the Directive,
which clearly defines both what inside information is and who is
an insider Section 10b does not define or even use those terms,
though courts do.
*379 As seen, there are both important
similarities and divergences between the Directive and the SEA.
U.S. securities law is essentially federal, though vestigal state
anti-fraud provisions in tort such as the tort of deceit
232
do still exist and supplement the federal provisions. This is just
about the opposite of Europe, where the securities laws of the
Member States are still the starting point. Though, as time
passes, the European law will displace the national laws.
One key feature of
U.S. securities law is that it usually permits both a criminal
action by the state and a private enforcement by individuals. This
"privatization" of the public's authority to punish crime is much
more often available in the U.S. than in Europe. Directives do not
provide for private enforcement because they are meant to
establish goals and guidelines, requiring the Member States to
take action, but leaving to the Member States how to implement
them. Further, Directives only provide for minimum standards -
Member States are generally free to go beyond the minima of the
Directives and to propose greater protections.
233
Ironically this flexibility also explains why a truly uniform
European law cannot not be attained using Directives. Yet,
Directives can create the groundwork necessary if one day creation
of a European Code to displace national laws were desired. In all
events, while in fact unlikely, a Member State could create a
private right of action in its own national law and this would
quite likely be found to be consistent with the Directives' goals
and permissible range of action. The EU can attain a clearer and
more coherent law of insider trading than the U.S. Whether it can
do so throughout Europe is the greater challenge.
2. A European
Securities and Exchange Commission?
Some authors recommend
that the EU establish its own Securities and Exchange Commission.
For example, Manning argues that:
[T]he EU
should ... reestablish the European Securities Committee as an
independent administrative agency that would, in addition to its
rule-making authority, help develop and monitor the proposed
centralized clearance and settlement system, maintain the proposed
centralized filing system, collect and disseminate compliance and
enforcement data, coordinate Member State enforcement of EU
securities laws and regulations, monitor the administration of
alternative
*380 dispute resolution proceedings, and
provide consumer education to retail investors to further develop
and protect its unified retail securities market.
234
His is not the only
voice and is essentially correct. The EU should develop a
securities and exchange authority because a central authority can
act more rapidly and decisively, and also because a central
authority will inevitably develop a unitary law reducing legal
uncertainty and transaction costs.
235 Twenty five or more
national authorities are inevitably going to be less efficient and
inevitably divided in their approach than one central authority.
Moreover, a central authority can and should look not just at
sectors, which is the current approach,
236
but rather at the entire financial services business.
237
"Just as the euro required the establishment of a European Central
Bank, a pan-European equity market will require a European SEC."
238
Opponents of an EU SEC
center their arguments around the idea that private market
incentives will best protect investors.
239
However, private remedies would do so suboptimally, since there
would be twenty five different national views with attendant
uncertainty and higher transaction costs.
Inside traders in U.S.
law are under an obligation to disclose the inside information or
abstain from trading. One author recommends increased disclosure
as a part of EU securities law, noting that: "Investors need
consistency and comparability in financial statement presentations
and timely disclosure of material corporate events."
240
For example, there is no equivalent to the shareholder's right to
inspection guaranteed by the EU in any of the Directives.
Similarly, the EU needs to either complete the establishment of
international accounting standards (IAS) or accept the reality
that the U.S. standard Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) are the world standard.
*381 241 Uniform standards for
accounting and languages would result in lower transaction costs
and greater market efficiency.
b. The Legal Basis of
the EU SEC: Art. 308 and/or Art. 2
If a European
Securities Authority were created it would most likely be based on
Article 308 ECT (ex art. 235).
242 Art. 308 provides
that:
If action
by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course
of the operation of the Common Market, one of the objectives of
the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary
powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from
the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take
the appropriate measures.
This clause might be
compared to the combined effect of the elastic clause
243
and the commerce clause
244 in the U.S.
constitution in that it theoretically empowers the Community to do
much more than is explicitly stated in other provisions of the
treaty. However, at least to now, Art. 308 is not as liberally
construed as the commerce clause of the U.S. constitution. The
action taken under Art. 308 must be "necessary to attain" an
"objective of the Community", as no other provision addresses a
securities and exchange authority. The objective to be obtained, a
single market in securities, is clearly a central task of the
Community as set out in Article 2 of the Treaty:
[T]he
Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market
and an economic and monetary union and by implementing common
policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 4, to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable
development of economic activities and economic and social
cohesion and solidarity among Member States.
Further in Article
3.1(c) and 3.1(g) state that:
1. For the
purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community
shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with
the timetable set out therein:
(c) an internal market
characterized by the abolition, as between Member States, of
obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital;
(g) a system ensuring
that competition in the internal market is not distorted;
Thus, if the goals of
a single capital market cannot be achieved with twenty five
national authorities - that is, if the subsidiarity argument can
*382 be overcome, which I think is the
case - then these provisions of the the Treaty would be the basis
of a European Securities Authority. As there is a European
Prospectus Regulation it is likely that Europe will at some point
establish a central securities authority. Like the single
currency, the reduced transaction costs and economies resulting
make such a development desirable.
II. European Tax Law
Just as Europe seeks
to harmonize securities law it also seeks to create a uniform tax
law, albeit less successfully. It uses the same instruments:
Directives, regulations, conventions and case law.
A. Tax Teleology
Adam Smith long ago
set out four principles of taxation: Taxes should be simple. Taxes
should be levied according to ability to pay. Taxes should be easy
to administer. Taxes should be certain and economically neutral.
245
This idea that taxation should be economically neutral to avoid
economic distortion is a part of the European tax system, however
imperfectly implemented
246 and this idea is at
the root of several community decisions.
247
This can be seen for example in the fiscal aspects of state aids.
State subsidization of industry normally would be seen by
economists as a distortion of the free market. For this reason,
direct and indirect state aids are problematic under the EC
Treaty.
*383 B. State Aids and Taxation
EU Member States
cannot grant aid which threatens to distort the single market.
Article 87(1) (ex Article 92(1)) provides:
Save as
otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain
undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far
as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with
the common market.
State aid is not
defined by the EC Treaty,
248 however, favorable
tax treatment such as a tax credit can constitute a state aid.
Though, de minimis state aids are permissible,
249
Art. 87 is to be construed narrowly.
250 Taxes used to finance
state aids which were found permissible under Art. 87, have been
held nevertheless invalid as interfering with the single market
under Art. 90 (ex art. 95)
251 for if the court were
to consider a state aid separately from the financing mechanism
used to fund it and attain it would be impossible to attain the
objectives of the EC Treaty.
252 For example:
It may be
that aid properly so-called, although not in conformity with
Community law, does not substantially affect trade between states
and may thus be acknowledged as permissible but that the
disturbance which it creates is increased by a method of financing
it which would render the scheme as a whole incompatible with a
single market and the common interest.
253
*384 Unlike Art. 87, which is conditional,
254
Art. 90 is unconditional.
255 Article 87, alone,
does not have direct effect.
256 Article 90 can have
direct effect.
257 When a national tax
only partly violates article 90- where for example the basis taxed
is valid, but the tax rate discriminates between domestic and
foreign entities taxed - whether the tax will be partly enforced
is for the national legislator to determine.
258
Partial enforcement of the tax would not be a contravention of
Community law.
The objectives of
principled economic liberalism were also upheld in Pabst &
Richarz KG v. Hauptzollamt Oldenberg.
259 There, a tax scheme
was held in violation of the treaty where the tax was essentially
to further an anti-competitive monopoly. As a general rule,
wherever a tax impedes the formation of the single market we
should expect it will not be permitted.
C. Conventions to Avoid Double Taxation
The principle of
avoiding double taxation is another liberal economic view that
finds its expression in the practice of EU law. Double taxation,
whether of income or of income sources, is bad economics because
double taxation just about always distorts market transactions.
Taxing a good increases its price reducing demand for that good,
and double taxing a good makes the good even less likely to be
bought.
Tax conventions,
whether bilateral or multilateral, are the usual method to avoid
the double taxation that occurs when two different governments
claim to be able to tax the same source of income or the same
taxpayer.
260 The OECD proposes
model conventions which have been taken up and enacted by numerous
states.
261
*385 Discriminatory taxation is sometimes
challenged as a violation of the right to establishment. Art. 43
(ex art. 52) of the EC Treaty (right of establishment) is one of
the basic freedoms of the EC Treaty and as such has direct effect,
creating rights and duties in and enforceable by individuals.
262
Where a Member State
takes steps to prevent double taxation of dividends the
exoneration from double taxation the Member State must also
provide such exoneration for the branches of companies from other
Member States that are doing business in the Member State in
question.
263 Moreover, tax
advantages provided to a company of a Member State by that Member
State as part of a double taxation treaty with a non-Member State
must also be provided to permanent establishments in that Member
State of companies of other Member States.
264
However, the
obligations that the ECT imposes on Member States do not normally
affect the obligations of Member States to non-Member States under
treaties to avoid double taxation.
265 Two Member States
*386 can thus have differing policies as
to third states. For example, a German and French company could be
taxed differently on their overseas operations in a non-Member
State by the non Member State with no conflict arising under EC
law.
D. Directives Our analysis of tax law Directives looks first at
non-binding and then at binding norms.
Non-binding codes of
conduct are one more instrument that the EU has which it uses to
encourage harmonization of laws. For example, the EU has proposed
a non-binding Code of Conduct which was signed by Finance
Ministers at the ECOFIN Council meeting in 1997. The objective of
the Code of Conduct is to prevent a "race to the bottom"
266
where each Member State lowers its taxation to attract businesses
with an attended reduction in social services and decline in the
quality of life. "[B]y signing the resolution, Member States
commit themselves not to introduce new harmful tax measures and to
amend existing harmful tax measures as soon as possible."
267
The Code is "a political commitment and does not affect the Member
States' rights and obligations or the respective spheres on
competence of the Member States and the Community arising from the
Treaty" .
268 That is, the Code is
a non-binding resolution. However "if Member States do not take
action to remove the provisions identified as harmful, the
Commission may be prepared to use Article 96 of the Treaty to
propose a Directive to the Council, who may then act on a
qualified majority."
269
*387 b. Mutual Assistance Directive
Like the Code of
Conduct, the Mutual Assistance Directive
270
provides a cadre in which Member States taxing authorities can
exchange information in order to combat tax fraud.
271
These soft law provisions provide an important context in which
law can be interpreted and applied.
Mergers and
acquisitions of companies almost always raise tax issues because
the sale of stock involved technically is a realization event. The
merger Directive defers taxation of capital gains of property
transferred pursuant to "mergers, divisions, transfers of assets
and exchanges of shares" where the assets are still taxable by
that jurisdiction. Professor Sandra Eden provides an exemplary
illustration of the type of problem the Merger Directive
addresses:
company A,
a manufacturing company in the United Kingdom, decides to tranfer
all its operations in Newcastle to company B in Germany in
exchange for shares in B. There will be no charge to tax on the
disposal of the assets to B, because the assets will be attached
to a permanent establishment of B's in the United Kingdom, and so
will remain within the United Kingdom tax charge. The deferred
gain will be caught when B disposes of the assets.
273
Essentially, the
taxation of the realized gain or loss in the transaction is
deferred because the taxable basis was not transferred outside the
tax jurisdiction of the Member State and because such corporate
restructurings would be disfavored were the gain or loss
immediately recognized. The basis of the capital good is
transferred to its new owner and will serve as the starting point
to determine tax when the good if finally alienated. This deferral
of taxation in order to permit flexible restructuring is one more
example of the principle of economic neutrality of taxation
guiding community tax law.
*388 b. Parent Subsidiary Directive
The Parent Subsidiary
Directive
274 is very similar to
the merger Directive. The goal of both Directives is to allow
enterprises to flexibly reorganize their operations without being
influenced by tax considerations. The objective of the Parent
Subsidiary Directive is "to exempt dividends and other profit
distributions paid by subsidiary companies to their parent
companies from withholding taxes and to eliminate double taxation
of such income at the level of the parent company" .
275
The Directives exempt cross-border dividend payments from
withholding taxes where such dividends are paid within a corporate
group: Member states can either exempt the dividend or provide an
equivalent tax credit. There must be at least 25% control of the
company in question by the parent and both the company paying and
the company receiving the dividend must be fiscal residents of
Member States.
276
D. Cases: Futura, Marks and Spencer, and the Principle of
Territoriality
Internationally, it is
generally admitted that residents are taxable for their income
regardless of its source, but non-residents are taxable only on
income sourced to the taxing jurisdiction. Thus, in principle
residents and non-residents can be taxed differently under the EC
Treaty.
277
However this theoretical starting point does not really decide the
issue. The goal of building a single market, the right to free
movement of persons, and the attendant duty to avoid
discriminatory treatment, whether in terms of taxation or services
leads the court to analyze tax liabilities in terms of the
practical facts on a case by case basis.
278
One example of this is the Futura Participations SA v.
Administration des Contributions
279 decision.
The question presented
in Futura was whether a Member State can limit the right of a
permanent establishment (corporate headquarters)to
*389 offset gains with losses only for
losses which were realized in that Member State.
280
Of course, while "direct taxation falls within the competence of
the Member States, the latter must none the less exercise that
competence consistently with Community law and therefore avoid any
overt or covert discrimination on grounds of nationality"
281
That is, the court looks beyond discriminatory intent and
considers also discriminatory effect as a basis for breach of
treaty obligations.
282 Even though "direct
taxation does not as such fall within the purview of the Community
. . ., the powers retained by the Member States must nevertheless
be exercised consistently with Community law" .
283
Thus, a law which has the effect of discrimination on the basis of
nationality is in principle contrary to the EC Treaty. This is
obviously consistent with the goal of the EU (a single market for
labor, capital, and goods) and its teleology (economic liberalism
in the service of peace and prosperity).
Yet, in Futura the
court pointed out the power of the Member States to tax:
"effectiveness of fiscal supervision constitutes an overriding
requirement of general interest capable of justifying a
restriction on the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by
the Treaty"
284 The court did not
need to affirm the power of the Member State to derogate from its
treaty obligations to reach the economically neutral liberal
result, yet did so. Moreover, though the court already had
*390 enough reasons to decide the issue in
favor of the single market/economic liberalism, it went on,
unnecessarily, to justify its decision on the basis of the
principle of fiscal territoriality.
285 This is the
interesting part of the decision. First, it was just as much
surplusage as the statements on the ability of Member States to
derogate from their treaty obligations in the interest of orderly
taxation. Moreover, the principle of territoriality presents a
counterbalance to the power of the Member State to derogate from
the treaty. Member State taxation may only derogate from the
treaty if such derogation is consistent with the principle of
fiscal territoriality.
The principle of
territoriality is a general principle of international law and of
community law,
286 if only because the
EC and EU treaties are treaties under international law and
subject thereto. The principle of territoriality states that a
taxing jurisdiction may tax income sourced from that jurisdiction,
and that the taxing jurisdiction has an absolute right to tax its
nationals.
287 By establishing these
concurring norms - the right of Member States to derogate from the
treaty, but subject to the principle of territoriality - the court
allows itself in future decisions to justify any outcome it wants
to.
The court in Steinike
was confronted by a state aid offered by Germany to aid German
food processing companies to open new domestic and foreign
markets.
288 The Commission had
been informed of the aid and had not objected.
289
The German food processors received the aid regardless of the
origin of the food to be processed.
290 The court noted
prohibition in ex Art. 92 are not absolute but are conditional
291
*391 and then went on to do a multi-factor
balancing test.
292 Interestingly, the
court did make clear that a state aid cannot at once be a tax
under article 90 (ex article 95) and a charge having equivalent
effect to a customs duty under former articles 9,12 and 13.
293
A British company,
with several subsidiaries also incorporated in Britain and other
Member States, divested itself of its foreign establishments.
295
Britain allowed tax transparency between British companies,
whether doing business in Britain or overseas, but did not allow
tax transparency between subsidiaries owned by British companies
but incorporated in other Member States.
296
Essentially, dividend payments from the foreign subsidiary to the
British parent company were not taxed if the subsidiary was
incorporated in Britain but would be taxed if the company were set
up under the laws of another Member State.
297
Losses would also be allowed to offset gains within the corporate
group, but only as to companies incorporated under British law.
298
This presented a case of differential taxation. The question was
whether the tax preference was a violation of the right of
establishment under former articles 43 and 48 (now articles 37 and
39).
299
The court decided that while in theory such differential tax
treatment might under certain circumstances be permissible, namely
(at least) where there is the opportunity for the foreign
subsidiary to offset the double taxation in the tax system of the
other Member State.
300 Where the foreign
subsidiary has however exhausted all opportunities to avoid the
double taxation, such differential taxation would be a violation
of the EC Treaty.
301 The court did make
clear that not only the tax credit to avoid double taxation of
dividend income but also loss deductions (including carry
forwards) would enter its considerations as to whether the
theoretically permissible differential taxation would be
*392 also allowed in the specific case at
bar. Though the court does not expressly invoke the doctrine of
fiscal realism in practice it does so in this case.
In Futura, Marks and
Spencer, and Steinike,
302 the court clearly
takes a realist approach: It is not interested in legal
formalities or whether the black letter law was observed. Rather
it looks to a number of factors
303 to reach a balanced
decision on a case by case basis.
304 In all these cases
the court is leaving itself openings, both in noting the power of
Member States to tax more or less as they see fit, and in
describing the principle of territoriality so that it can justify
whatever result it feels necessary to achieve the single market.
The court gives in to the Member States whenever absolutely
necessary, yet advancing the process of legal integration whenever
possible.
III. European Corporate Law: The Right of Establishment
and the Societas Europa
A. National Law: Real Seat Theory of Corporate Nationality v.
Place of Incorporation Theory of Corporate Nationality
The citizenship and
residence of companies are treated very differently in common law
as opposed to the civil law. This fact marks EU business law and
must be explained if we are to understand EU law.
Most common law
jurisdictions adhere to the "incorporation theory" - a corporation
is deemed to be the creature of the state where it is
incorporated, regardless of where it does business. The internal
affairs of the corporation are governed by the laws of the place
of incorporation, even when it does business outside of that
state. The advantages of the place of incorporation theory is that
it allows the company to move without being obliged to dissolve
itself and reincorporate. The place of incorporation theory also
allows management to forum shop. It is also a rule of easy and
certain application, a type of bright line test.
*393 Though some civilian jurisdictions
such as the Netherlands and Switzerland do take up the place of
incorporation theory, France and Germany among others do not. Most
continental civilian jurisdictions takes a different view from the
"incorporation theory" and instead use the "real seat theory"
(Sitztheorie) to determine residency. The "real seat theory" holds
that the corporation is a citizen of the state where it has its
headquarters, i.e. does business. The corporation is obliged to
register or incorporate where it has its headquarters or it will
be denied legal personality. This rule makes it easier for host
states to control foreign corporations but makes it difficult for
the corporation to move since dissolution and reincorporation
would be required to do so. This theory prevents forum shopping.
Both rules exist in
the EU today. A Directive could force Member States to adopt one
or the other theory. However none exists or is proposed. In fact
"the 'place of incorporation' doctrine coexists best with the goal
of a single European market because it recognizes foreign
companies and the laws that govern their internal affairs and it
allows companies to move to a new state.
305
Understanding the
differences between these two regulatory systems is essential for
understanding the conflicts arising out of the right of
establishment.
B. The Case Law of the Right of Establishment: Daily Mail,
Centros, Ueberseering and Futura
It is well settled
that any enterprise incorporated in the EU has in principle the
right to do business anywhere in the Union. The right of
establishment is central to the single market and one of the four
basic rights guarantied by the ECT. However, this nearly absolute
right in principle is not without problems in practice.
An early leading case
on the right of establishment isDaily Mail.
306
A British company wished to transfer its head office from England
to the Netherlands to take advantage of a more favorable Dutch
taxation system.
307 That move required
prior approval of the tax authorities.
308 The required approval
was not forthcoming.
309
*394 One might think that the ECJ could
have rejected this move as an example of tax evasion resulting
from manipulation of law - abus de droit. Or, one could imagine
the court saying that such a move would be illegal by invoking a
doctrine of fiscal realism. It is clearly a general principle of
tax law that tax authorities, whether in France or the United
States, look not to the form of a transaction but at its substance
to determine its effects. And general principles of law are a
source of law, both in international law
310
and in EU law.
311 Yet, the court did
not take these obvious doctrinal moves, neither in Daily Mail, nor
in its progeny (Centros, Ueberseering, Futura)! Rather, the court
limited itself to an examination of the EC Treaty. But, the court
did not follow the obvious teleology of the treaty. It did not
determine that the right of establishment should permit the
British company to establish its head office in the Netherlands.
Rationales for such a decision could be to encourage integration
of the single market and even to encourage regulatory competition
among the Member States. Instead, the court determined that the
right of establishment did not permit the company incorporated in
one Member State to move its head office to another Member State,
312
at least not where such move was motivated by tax avoidance
purposes (and we must remember, tax avoidance is not per se tax
fraud). The reasoning of the court is that the EC Treaty does not
adopt either the real seat theory or the place of incorporation
theory. Thus, the issue was left for national law to determine,
and Articles 43 and 48 of the Treaty of Rome do not give companies
an absolute right to transfer their head office.
313
After Daily Mail an
observer might think that the ECJ would see through attempts to
manipulate the tax system and not allow the EC Treaty to be
invoked to further such schemes, applying a sort of "fiscal
realism by other means" . In fact however that has not proven to
be the case as seen first inCentros Ltd v. Erhvervs og
Selskabsstyrelsen.
314
The facts of Centros
are as follows: Residents of Denmark wished to incorporate a
"shell" company in the UK and to then use that company to conduct
business in Denmark. No business was to be transacted in the UK.
Clearly then this was an example of abusing the legal system to
obtain a pecuniary result. Namely, the avoidance of Danish rules
requiring all companies to have a minimum of capital prior to
incorporation. The risk claimed by Denmark was that such
manipulation places creditors at risk. Yet, despite Daily Mail,
the ECJ held that Denmark was required to recognize the formally
"foreign" company and allow it to do business in Denmark. Like
Netherlands and the UK, Denmark follows the incorporation theory
of corporate residence.
315
The best justification
ofCentros would be a reductio ad absurdam. If Denmark were allowed
not to recognize the formally British company what about other
companies? Would a company owned by French nationals incorporated
in Britain be able to do business in Denmark? A similar
justification would be the idea that each Member State must
essentially give full faith and credit to the legal acts of the
other Member States. But why should those rationales be permitted
to justify an abuse of the law through manipulation to disguise
transactions?
The court does in fact
recognize both the possibility of legal manipulation and the right
of Member States to prevent abuse of community law at least by its
own citizens.
316 However, measures
which restrict the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty must be
"applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by
imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be
suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they
pursue; and they must not go
*396 beyond what is necessary in order to
attain it" .
317 In Centros, this was
not the case, since the end, protection of creditors, would not
have been met by the means as to British companies incorporated by
Britons.
318 There were less
restrictive means to the legitimate end sought by the Danish
government.
319 To an American
lawyer, this looks a lot like means-ends constitutional review.
320
After Centros and
Daily Mail the community law seemed at odds with itself. The
situation was clarified, somewhat, in theUeberseering decision.
The facts ofUeberseering are as follows: A company was
incorporated in the Netherlands. It is owned by German nationals,
but not registered as a German company. Can that company go before
German courts? German law follows the real seat theory
(Sitztheorie). Since the ostensibly Dutch company was not
registered in Germany, which was the place of the center of its
economic interests (the place where it has its administration or
headquarters) Germany considered that the entity was subject to
German law. As it was not properly registered it had no legal
existence under German law. The problem is that this amounts to
non-recognition of a foreign company, and thus might be a breach
of the EC Treaty.
So the question is,
whetherUeberseering is more like Daily Mail, or more like Centros?
Or is it sui generis? InUeberseering there was no attempt at
manipulation of law or of tax avoidance. So there may in fact be
no analogy betweenUeberseering on the one hand and Daily Mail or
Centros on the other. Nevertheless, the court and analysts seems
to consider the cases as somehow related: They all concern the
rights of foreign establishments, and legal fictions. But the
legal fiction inUeberseering is invoked by the state (denying the
factual existence of the company) whereas the legal fiction
invoked in Centros and Daily Mail is invoked by the individual.
SoUeberseering on the one hand and Centros and Daily Mail on the
other are not in fact analogous.
In any event, the ECJ
inUeberseering required legal fictions to resemble practical
facts. Germany was forced to recognize the existence of the
formally Dutch company under Articles 43 and 48 of the Treaty of
Rome. The German law was not considered a reasonable means tothe
*397 permissible end of protecting
creditors.
321 The German measure
was not proportional.
322 Moreover, the German
ruling denied the company its fundamental right to establishment,
323
the right to a fair hearing
324 and possibly the
right to own property.
325 However, the ECJ did
not appear to consider the disturbing fact that it attributed
fundamental human rights to a non-human!
The court's decision
would support an analogy of Ueberseering to Centros rather than to
Daily Mail because Centros, likeUeberseering, addressed the
relation of a host state and a corporation.
326
The ECJ distinguished Daily Mail from Ueberseering because Daily
Mail "concerned relations between a company and the Member State
under whose laws it had been incorporated" while "the present case
concerns the recognition by one Member State of a company
incorporated under the law of another Member State."
327
That is, Ueberseering involved not the right of a company to move
outside of the state it incorporated in, but rather whether a
company has a right to recognition in a host state.
328
This implies perhaps that a company could compel recognition in a
"real seat theory" Member State by incorporating in an
"incorporation theory" Member State, but only possibly,
sinceUeberseering clearly involved no element of fraud or other
abuse of the law. However the facts ofUeberseering are
sufficiently different from Centros and Daily Mail such that one
can question whether any analogy at all should be found.
Whatever we think
about the fact thatUeberseering tries, unsuccessfully, to defuse
the conflict between Centros and Daily mail by forcing an analogy
that is really not there the fact is:Ueberseering sends a clear
message that ambiguities will be resolved in favor of the
Community and the single market."
329
C. Regulation: The Societas Europa
330
The Societas Europa
(SE) is an attempt to overcome the problem that there are two
differing theories of corporate residency. It is also an
*398 attempt to create a European company
form. How does one form an SE? What are its advantages?
The SE is business
corporation with legal personality. The SE must be registered in
one of the Member States, and its place of registration must also
be the seat of its headquarters. SE's face a minimum
capitalization requirement of 120,000 euros.
331
Liability of shareholders is limited to the value of their
investment.
332 The SE is subject to
the same formalities of registration, reporting, and internal
governance that are found in similar national laws.
2. Formation of the
Societas Europa
SE's are created by
merger of national corporations (e.g., SA, GmbH, AG, PLC), whether
as equals, holdings, or subsidiaries, where at least two of the
merged companies are from different Member States;
333
The SE cannot be created from scratch, rather only through merger
of existing companies from two or more Member States.
3. Advantages and
Limits of the SE
The advantage of the
SE is that it is easier for an SE in a real seat theory state to
transfer its registered office from one Member State to another.
334
Transfer of the head office does not require dissolution and
reincorporation.
335 Thus the SE is
adapted to solving the problem of real seat theory states.
336
The SE is intended to reduce administrative and transaction costs
to help build a single efficient market to benefit all Europeans.
It should reduce administrative and transaction costs by an
estimated 30 Billion euros.
337
Some do question
whether harmonization efforts lead to lower transaction costs.
338
The better answer is a qualified yes. Of course, greater legal
certainty, lower transaction costs, and more transparency are
always possible. However the question is not whether the efforts
at integration reach the very best result possible in theory.
Rather thequestion
*399 is whether they achieve better
results than an unharmonized system. And the answer to that
question is clearly yes.
IV. Conclusion
Directives,
regulations, case law and conventions together form a body of
binding EU business law. Such laws are inevitable, and inevitably
evolving, as the Community grows into a Union and federation.
These laws foster peace by creating the conditions for liberal
trade and attendant prosperity. These developments are hopeful as
they will make the world more wealthy and thus make conflict less
likely. Rather than viewing the EU with fear, U.S. policy makers
should see that the challenge the EU represents is also an
opportunity.
Notes:
1. See
Andrea
J. Gildea, Uberseering: A European Company Passport, 30 Brook.
J. Int'l L. 25, 292 (2004). "Presently, a hybrid system of
recognition exists in Europe. It consists of national rules, EC
rules, and a somewhat substantial zone of ambiguity between the
two regimes." Id.
2. Economies of Scale,at
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economiesofscale.asp
(
404? Wayback Link.
Mar. 30, 2006). "The increase in efficiency of production as the
number of goods being produced increases. Typically, a company
that achieves economies of scale lowers the average cost per unit
through increased production since fixed costs are shared over an
increased number of goods." Id.
3. 1 Adam Smith, An
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations Ch. 1,
para. 3 (University of Chicago Press 1976) (1776) (noting an
example of increased production in a pin factory due to
specialization).
4. See, e.g., "Eli
Whitney" at
http://www.answers.com/topic/eli-whitney
(
404? Wayback Link.
Mar. 30, 2006).
5. See4Adam Smith, An
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations Ch. 2,
para. 15 (University of Chicago Press 1976) (1776) (discussing
restraints upon importation from foreign countries of goods that
can be produced at home).
6. See Gildea, supra note
1 at 258.
7. See Eric Allen Engle,
The
Transformation of the International Legal
System: The Post-Westphalian Legal Order, 23 QLR 23, 26 (2004).
8.
Eduardo
M. Penalver, Property As Entrance, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1889,
1900-1901 n. 32(2005).
9. See generally Smith,
supra note 3; David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political
Economy and Taxation 7.13-7.16 (John Murray 1817),available at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Ricardo/ricP2a.html#Ch.7,%20On%CC20Foreign%20Trade
10. See
generally,Smith,supra note 3.
11. See
Eugene
Kontorovich, The Arab League Boycott And WTO Accession: Can
Foreign Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions? 4Chi. J. Int'l
L. 283, 286 (2003)."[T]he free trade system was designed to
promote not just prosperity but peaceful and amicable relations
between Member States ..." Id.
12. Smith, supra note 3
at Ch. 1, para. 3 (noting an example of increased production in a
pin factory due to specialization).
13.Ricardo,supra note 9,
at 7.13-7.16.
14. See
Debra
Steger, Peace And Prosperity Through Trade, 20 Am. U. Int'l L.
Rev. 1133, 1133 (2005).
"'Peace and
prosperity through trade' was the basic objective on which the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") was founded almost
sixty years ago and it remains the fundamental raison d'etreof the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") today." Id.
15. See Eric Allen Engle,
The Transformation of the International Legal System: The
Post-Westphalian Legal Order, 23Quinnipiac L. Rev. 23, 26 (2004).
16. See generally
Alastair
J. Walling, Early To Bed, Early To Rise, Work Like Hell And
Globalize,13 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 161, 174 (2003/2004)
(discussing whether globalization is a good thing). See also
Michael J. Trebilcock, Critiquing the Critics of Economic
Globalization, 1J. Int'l L. & Int'l Rel. 213, 233-234 (2005)
(noting that if each EU state "aspired to be self-sufficient in
food, this would contradict the entire European economic
integration process").
17 Timothy
Garton Ash, Free World: Why a Crisis of the West Reveals the
Opportunity of Our Time, 102, 221-22. (Allen Lane ed. Random
House 2004).
18.
Paul
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change
and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 352-59(Vintage Books
1989).
19. See generally
Kennedy, supra note 18.
20.
Paul
W. Kahn, American Hegemony And International Law Speaking Law To
Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, And The New
International Order, 1 Chi. J. Int'l L. 1, 6 (2000). "A
strand of military analysis asserts that nuclear weapons are quite
useless devices." Id.
21. See
Christopher
B. Stone, Signaling Behavior, Congressional-Executive
Agreements, And The Salt I Interim Agreement, 34 Geo.Wash. Int'l
L. Rev. 305, 305 (2002). In quoting former President R. M.
Nixon's memoirs:
It was clear
to me by 1969 that there could never be absolute parity between
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the area of nuclear and conventional
armaments... [A]bsolute parity in every area of armaments would
have been meaningless, because there is a point in arms
development at which each nation has the capacity to destroy the
other. Beyond that point the most important consideration is not
continued escalation of the number of arms but maintenance of the
strategic equilibrium while making it clear to the adversary that
a nuclear attack, even if successful, would be suicidal.
Id. at 339.
22. Engle, supra note 15,
at 34.
23. Col.
Michael
Wansink,
Whither Sovereignty?, National Defense University Executive
Research Project S19, at 22, 35, available at
http://www.ndu.edu/library/ic6/95-S19.pdf
(
404? Wayback Link.
Mar. 30, 2006).
24. See Engle, supra note
15, at 29-30.
25. See, e.g., Project
for a New American Century,:Rebuilding America's Defenses,Report
of the Project of the New American Century (2000) at
http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf
(
404? Wayback Link.
Mar. 30, 2006).
26. See
Susan
George, The International Geo-Economic System in
Human
Rights in Perspective 275 (Asbjorn Eide, Bernt Hagtvet, ed.,
Blackwell 1992) (making an incisive argument that military
power is outmoded but has been replaced by financial power which
is more subtle and effective than direct control).
27. See Engle, supra note
15, for an extended discussion of this thesis.
28. As a theory of
sociology, functionalism is essentially organicist, analogizing
society to an organism, with each member having particular
functions, like organs of a body. See, e.g.,
Kent
McClelland, Theoretical Perspectives in Sociology,
Functionalism, (2000),at
http://web.grinnell.edu/courses/soc/s00/soc111-01/IntroTheories/Functionalism.html
(
404? Wayback Link.
Mar. 30, 2006).
29. SeeJosé E.
Alvarez, Steve Charnovitz,Triangulating The World Trade
Organization, 96Am. J. Int'l L. 28, 48 (2002). "The core idea of
functionalism is that international governance should be organized
according to 'tasks' and 'functional lines."'Id.
30.
Hans
J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law,
34 Am. J. Int'l L 260, 283 (1940). Noting that grandiose
legalistic schemes purporting to solve the ills of the world have
replaced the painstaking search for the actual laws and the facts
underlying them). Id.
31. See
Antony
Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International
Financial Institutions, and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l
L. & Pol. 243, 264 n. 57 (2000) (quotingBartram S.
Brown, The United States and the Politicization of the World Bank
14-15 (Keegan Paul 1992)).
Functionalism
is a theory of international organization which holds that a world
community can best be achieved not by attempts at the immediate
political union of states, but by the creation of non-political
international agencies dealing with specific economic, social,
technical, or humanitarian functions. Functionalists assume that
economic, social and technical problems can be separated from
political problems and insulated from political pressures.
Id. "Brown's
important work has a special relevance to the current operations
of the IFIs." Id.
32. "The
neo-functionalist theory that has driven much of European
integration, for example, posits that supranational institutions
formed for fairly narrow purposes will attract political support
over time and will thereby be able to expand their functions."
Ernest
A. Young, The Trouble With Global Constitutionalism, 38Tex.
Int'l L.J. 527, 540 n.86 (2003).
33. "... [F]unctionalism
... has enabled the incremental, progressive development of the
European Union."
34.
Laura Dale, The Economic Impact Of Replacing The Federal Income
Tax With A Federal Consumption Tax: Leveling The International
Playing Field, 9Int'l Trade L.J. 47, 47 (2000). See, e.g,
Myrtle
D. Bishop, Samuel J. Chandle, Opportunities And Challenges: The
Caribbean Involvement In The Free Trade Area Of The
Americas, 27 Fordham Int'l L.J. 909, 913 (2004) (noting that
the FTAA is the world's largest free trade zone). However, the
FTAA is still under construction and only comprises free trade in
goods, not in labor.
35. This may be because
functionalism and democratic deficit are capable of coexisting.
Secondarily, as the Union expands, political integration becomes
more difficult, despite the insistance that new states accept the
acquis communataire, the attained goals of the Union, such as the
single currency.
36. See1
(*)
Part 2 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Adelaide 2004),available at
http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/a8po/book1.html
(
404? Wayback Link.
Mar. 30, 2006).
"When several
villages are united in a single complete community, large enough
to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into
existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing
in existence for the sake of a good life." Id.
37. 1Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics Ch. 5 (W.D.Ross trans., MIT 1994)available at
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.mb.txt
(
404? Wayback Link.
Mar. 30, 2006). "The life of money-making is one undertaken under
compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking;
for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else." Id.
38.
Manning
Gilbert Warren,Global Harmonization of Securities Laws:
The Achievements Of The European Communities, 31 Harv.
Int'l L.J. 185, 194 (1990).
39. See
Roberta
S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, 38
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 9, 12 (1999).
All over
Europe, governments are attempting to foster an equity culture for
both ideological and practical reasons. Government planning and
ownership of industry has fallen out of favor coincident with the
collapse of Communism. In any event, ever increasing budget
deficits are no longer sustainable by governments. One result of
this political shift to a free market ideology coupled with a
practical need to reduce government spending has been massive
privatizations of government owned assets
Id.
40. Id. at 13-14.
41. Treaty Establishing
the European Community, art. 2, Oct. 2, 1997, 37 I.L.M 56 (1998).
The Community
shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an
economic and monetary union and by implementing common policies or
activities referred to in Articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout
the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development
of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social
protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and
non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and
convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection
and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of
the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and
social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.
Id.
The Community
shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by
this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
In areas
which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
Any action by
the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the
objectives of this Treaty.
Id.
45.
U.S.
Const.
Art. VI cl. 2.
46.
Case
26/62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en
Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 ECR 1.
47. See Treaty
Establishing the European Community, supra note 41, at art. 5
(subsidiarity).
48. See Treaty
Establishing the European Community, supra note 41, at art. 308;
.S. Const. art I, § 8 cl.18.
49.
Alexander
B. St. John, The Regulation of Cross-Border Public Offerings of
Securities In The European Union: Present And Future, 29 Denv.
J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 239, 244-245 (2001).
50. See, e.g.,
Commission
Directive
2004/72, art.6(2),7, 2004 O.J.(L 162) 70, 73-74 (Market
Abuse Directive).
51. Warren,supra note 38,
at 215.
52. For a (critical)
examination of the "ends" of U.S. securities laws, see, e.g.,
Stanislav
Dolgopolo,Insider Trading And The Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical
Evaluation Of Adverse Selection In Market Making, 33 Cap. U. L.
Rev. 83, 86 (2004).
53. See Treaty
Establishing the European Community, supra note 41, at art. 37(2).
54.
Richard
Cole, Authentic Democracy: Endowing Citizens With A Human Right
In Their Genetic Information, 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 1241, 1285
n. 186 (2005).
55. Treaty of Amsterdam
Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing
the European Communities and Related Acts, art. 226, Nov. 10,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 56 (1998), also available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html
(
404? Wayback Link.
Mar. 30, 1996) (ex Art. 169, Treaty of Rome).
56. See Treaty of
Amsterdam, supra note 55, at art. 227 (ex Art. 170, Treaty of
Rome).
57. See, e.g.,
Case
C-91/92, Faccini Dori v. Recreb, SRL,
1994
E.C.R
I-3325.
58.
Case
26/62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en
Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 ECR 1.
See
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/fundamental_rights/legis/lgenforce_en.htm
(discussing enforcement of directives in employment and racial
discrimination cases).
59.
Derek
Devgun, Multilateral Capital Transfer Tax Treaty Relief Within
The European Community, E.L. Rev. 1995, 20(5), 451-470
(1995).
60. See Treaty of
Amsterdam,supra note 55, at art. 110(2).
61. See Treaty
Establishing the European Community, supra note 41, at art. 5.
62.
Case
26/62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en
Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 ECR 1.
63. Warren,supra note 38,
at 212.
64. See Treaty
Establishing the European Community, supra note 41, at art. 5.
65. See Treaty
Establishing the European Community, supra note 41, at art. 308.
EC Treaty provides:
If action by
the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of
the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the
Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers,
the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the
appropriate measures.
Id.
66. See Treaty of
Amsterdam,supra note 55, at art. 94.
67. Id. at art. 2 (e).
68. Directive 68/151/EEC,
Art. 2 (e).
69. Council Directive
77/91, preamble.,
1977
O.J.
(L 26) 1 (EEC).
70. Id.
71. Council Directive
78/855,
1978
O.J.
(L 295) 36 (EEC).
72. Council Directive
78/660,
1978
O.J.
(L 222) 11 (EEC).
73. Id.
74. Council Directive
82/891, art. 307,
1982
O.J.
(L 378) 47-54 (EEC) (discussing divisions of public limited
liability companies).
75. Id.
76. Council Directive
83/349, art. 7,
1983
O.J.
(L 193) 31 (EEC).
77. Council Directive
84/253, art, 3-6,
1984
O.J
(L 126) 20-26 (EEC).
78. Council Directive
2003/71,
2003
O.J.
(L.345) 64-89 (EC).
79. Id.
80. Commission Regulation
809/2004,
2004
O.J.
(L 149) 1 (EC).
81. Council Directive
2003/71, preamble,
2003
O.J.
(L 345) 64 (EC).
82. Council Directive
80/390,
1980
O.J.
(L 100) 1-26 (EEC).
83. Council Directive
89/298,
1989
O.J.
(L 124) 8-15 (EEC).
84. Council Directive
79/279,
1979
O.J.
(L 66) 21 (EEC), amended by Council Directive 82/148,
1982
O.J.
(L 62) 22 (EEC).
85. Council Directive
82/121,
1982
O.J.
(L 48) 26-29 (EEC).
86. Council Directive
88/627,
1988
O.J.
(L 348) 62-65 (1988) (EEC).
87. Council Directive
2001/34, para. 1,
2001
O.J.
(L 184) 36 (EC) states: "Directives 79/279/EEC, 80/390/EEC,
82/121/EEC and 88/627/EEC, as amended by the acts listed in Annex
II Part A, are hereby repealed ... 2. References to the repealed
Directives shall be construed as references to this Directive" .
Id.
88. Council Directive
2003/71, para. 3,
2003
O.J.
(L 345) 64 (EC). "For reasons of consistency, however, it is
appropriate to regroup the provisions of Directive 2001/34/EC
which stem from Directive 80/390/EEC together with Directive
89/298/EEC and to amend Directive 2001/34/EC accordingly." Id.
89. See
Case
C-350/02, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of
the Netherlands, 2004 E.C.R.I-6213.
Case
C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v Post
& Telekom Austria AG, 2000 E.C.R. I-10745.
90. Council Directive
2003/71, preamble,
2003
O.J.
(L 345) 64, 65 (EC) (discussing single market and investor
protection).
91.
Todd
A. Sulger, Harmonization Of Securities Market Regulations In The
European Union: Is The Price Tag Too High? 29 Cal. W. Int'l L.J.
221, 225 (1998).
92. See St. John, supra
note 49, at 245.
93. Council Directive
2003/71, art. 17,
2003
O.J.
(L 345) 78 (EC).
94. Council Directive
79/279,
1979
O.J.
(L 66) 21 (EEC), amended by Council Directive 82/148,
1982
O.J.
(L 62) 22 (EEC).
95. Sulger, supra note
91, at 224-225.
96. Council Directive
2003/71, art. 7,
2003
O.J.
(L 345) 73 (EC).
97. Directive 2001/34,
art. 43,
2001
O.J.
(L 184) 22-23 (EC).
98. Id. at 23.
99. Id. at 22.
100. Warren, supra note
38, at 210.
101. Council Directive
2003/71, art. 14,
2003
O.J.
(L 345) 76 (EC).
102. Directive 2001/34,
art. 98,
2001
O.J.
(L 184) 33 (EC).
103. See Council
Directive 80/390,
1980
O.J.
(L 100) 1-26(EEC).
104. SeeSt. John, supra
note 49, at 248. Id. at art. 8.
105. Id. at art. 4.
106. SeeSt. John, supra
note 49, at 248. Council Directive 80/390, art. 8,
1980
O.J.
(L 100) 1-26 (EEC).
107. Council Directive
2003/71, art. 5,
2003
O.J.
(L 345) 72073 (EC).
108. See St. John, supra
note 49, at 249.
109. Warren,supra note
3,8 at 212.
110. Council Directive
2003/71, art. 25,
2003
O.J.
(L 345) 81 (EC).
111. Directive 2001/34,
preamble,
2001
O.J.
(L 184) 9 (EC).
112. Warren, supra note
38, at 216
113. Id. at 216.
114. Id. at 212.
115. Id. at 212-213.
116. St. John,supra note
49, at 246.
117. Id.
118. 2001/34, art.
25(3), 2001 O.J. (L 184) 18 (EC).
119. Warren, supra note
38, at 214.
120. Id. at 214.
2001/34, 2001 O.J. (L 184) 7 (EC).
121. Id. at 214.
122. Sulger,supra note
91, at 230.
123. 2001/34, Annex III,
2001 O.J. (L 184) 71 (EC).
124. 2001/34, art.
89(1), 2001 O.J. (L 184) 31 (EC).
125. Warren, supra note
38, at 202.
126. For example,
traders who would be otherwise liable for inside trading can
immunize themselves by disclosing inside information. See SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401
F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
127. Rule 13d-1,
pursuant to beneficial ownership reporting requirements in §
13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
128.
Broc
Romanek, Mark S. Britton, Online Shareholder Activism: How to
Guard Against its Fallout 20 No. 5 ACCA Docket 32, 37
(2002).
129. Id. at 36.
130.
15
U.S.C.A.
§ 78n (d) 1 (2002).
131.
Shaun
Mulreed, Private Securities Litigation Reform Failure: How
Scienter has Prevented the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 From Achieving Its Goals, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 779,
784 n. 14 (2005).
132. "In accordance with
the principle of proportionality, it is necessary and appropriate
for the achievement of the basic objective of ensuring the
completion of a single securities market to lay down rules on a
single passport for issuers." Council Directive 2003/71, preamble,
2003 O.J. (L 345) 68 (EC).
133. "One of the
objectives of this Directive is to protect investors." Id. at 65.
134. Warren,supra note
38, at 209-210.
135. "The aim of this
Directive and its implementing measures is to ensure investor
protection and market efficiency, in accordance with high
regulatory standards adopted in the relevant international fora."
Council Directive 2003/71, preamble,
2003
O.J.
(L 345) 65 (EC).
136. Id. at 71. Council
Directive 89/298, art. 4, 9, 16,
1989
O.J.
(L 124) 8-15 (EEC) (repealed).
137. Warren, supra note
38 at 215.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 216.
140. Council Directive
2003/71, art. 3(1),
2003
O.J.
(L 345) 71 (EC).
141. Id. at 71-72.
142. Id.
143. Council Directive
2001/34, art. 17,
2001
O.J.
(L 184) 18-19 (EC).
144. Council Directive
2003/71, preamble,
2003
O.J.
(L 345) 8 (EC).
145. Securities Act of
1933, §§ 3-4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(c), 78(d) (2004).
146. Council Directive
2001/34, art. 37,
2001
O.J.
(L 184) 21 (EC).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 14.
150. Id. at 21.
151. Karmel,supra note
39, at 20.
152. Id.
153. Insider trading was
legal in Germany until 1994. See, e.g.,
Anupama
J. Naidu, Was its Bite Worse than its Bark? The Costs
Sarbanes-Oxley Imposes on German Issuers may Translate into
Costs to the United States, 18 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 271, 299
(2004).
154. Council Directive
Coordinating Regulations on Insider Trading,
1989
O.J.
(C 277) 13 [1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)] P 95,028.
155. Council Directive
2003/6,
2003
O.J.
(L 96) 16-26 (EC).
156. Id. at 20.
157.
Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 10 15
U.S.C.
§ 78j (1994) (discussing manipulative and deceptive
devices).
158. Council Directive
2003/6, art. 1(3),
2003
O.J.
(L 96) 21 (EC).
159. The Securities Act
of 1933 defines "security" as:
[A]ny note,
stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a 'security', or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.
The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines "security" as:
[A]ny note,
stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas,
or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any
instrument commonly known as a 'security' or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate
for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to any
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or
any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which
has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine
months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the
maturity of which is likewise limited.
160. Sec. &
Exch.Comm'n,v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc.,
474
F.2d
476; (9th Cir. 1973).
161. See, e.g.,
Case
C-384/02, Criminal Proceedings against Knud Gröngaard and Allan
Bang, 2005 (C 384) par. 22 (ECR). "Directive 89/592
prohibits insider dealing with the aim of protecting investor
confidence in the secondary market for transferable securities
and, consequently, of ensuring the proper functioning of that
market." Id.
162.
Adoption
of Insider Trading Rules Creates Wide Ban on Use of Information,
2 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 1 (June 21, 1989).
See also
Case
C-384/02, Criminal Proceedings against Knud Gröngaard and Allan
Bang, 2005 (C 384) par. 22 (ECR). "Directive 89/592
prohibits insider dealing with the aim of protecting investor
confidence in the secondary market for transferable securities
and, consequently, of ensuring the proper functioning of that
market." Id.
163. Council Directive
2003/6, preamble,
2003
O.J.
(L 96) 16,17 (EC).
164. The Securities and
Exchange Act of 1933 defines itself as "[A]n [Act] [t]o provide
full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in
interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to
prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes."
Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933). The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states that its purposes are "...
to protect interstate commerce, the national credit, the Federal
taxing power, to protect and make more effective the national
banking system and Federal Reserve System, and to insure the
maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions."
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §
15
U.S.C.A.
§78(b) (2006).
165.E.g.,supra note 153.
166.
Stephen
J. Leacock, In Search Of A Giant Leap: Curtailing Insider
Trading In International Securities Markets By The Reform Of
Insider Trading Laws Under European Union Council Directive
89/592, 3 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 51, 58 (1995).
167. Id.
168. Council Directive
89/592, art. 2,
1989
O.J.
(L 334) 30-32 (EEC).
169. Council Directive
2003/6, art. 2(1)(a-d),
2003
O.J.
(L 96) 16, 21 (EC) (defining insiders as members of boards
of Directives, key management, large shareholders and even
employees of the company).
170. Id. Case C-384/02,
Criminal Proceedings against Knud Gróngaard and Allan Bang,
2005 (C 384) par. 26 (ECR) (stating that under Article 3(a) of
Directive 89/592, the prohibition of disclosing inside information
does not apply to its disclosure by a person in the normal course
of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties).
171. Council Directive
2003/6, art. 3(a),
2003
O.J.
(L 96) 16, 21 (EC).
172. Id.
173. Tippees are defined
as those to whom fiduciary duty can be imputed based on their
relationship to an insider and/or the character of the information
they received. See U.S. v. Chiarella
588
F.2d
1358, 1365-67; (2d. Cir. 1978) rev'd, U.S. v. Chiarella,
445
U.S.
222 (1980). That definition is ambiguous.
174. Groengaard, 2005
E.C.R. II-0000. "Even if that rule, having regard to the terms
used, is capable of covering very different situations, it must,
as an exception to a general prohibition and in the light of the
objective pursued by Directive 89/592, be interpreted strictly."
Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id.(stating
that "[i]n order to determine whether a disclosure is justified in
a particular case, it is appropriate to take account also of the
sensitivity of the inside information in question. Particular care
is required when the disclosure is of inside information
manifestly capable of affecting significantly the price of the
transferable securities in question. In that context, it is
appropriate to observe that inside information relating to a
merger between two companies quoted on the stock exchange is in
general particularly sensitive.").
178. Council Directive
2003/6, art. 1(1),
2003
O.J.
(L 96) 16, 20 (EC).
179. "The term 'insider'
is not defined by statute in the context of the U.S. prohibitions
against insider trading." Michael D. Mann & Lise A.
Lustgarten,Internationalization of Insider Trading Enforcement: A
Guide to Regulation and Cooperation, PLI/Corp 7, 14 (1993).
180. "In fact, section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 (or any of the federal statutes, rules, or
regulations) do not define 'insider trading' or 'inside
information' (or 'misappropriation,' for that matter)." Micah A.
Acoba, Insider Trading Jurisprudence after United States v.
O'Hagan: A Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2) Perspective,
84Cornell L. Rev. 1356, 1362 (1999).
181. Warren, supra note
38, at 220.
182. Council Directive
2003/6, art. 1(1),
2003
O.J.
(L 96) 16, 20 (EC).
183. SeeU.S. v. Svoboda,
347 F.3d 471, 475 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2003).
184. Karmel, supra note
39, at 23.
185. Council Directive
89/592,
1989
O.J.
(L 334) 30, (EEC).
186. Council Directive
2003/6, art. 2(1),
2003
O.J.
(L 96) 16, 26 (EC).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Warren,supra note
38, at 220.
190. See,e.g., Council
Directive 2003/6, art. 6(2),
2003
O.J.
(L 96) 16, 21 (EC).
191. See generally
Treaty Establishing the European Community,
1992
O.J.
(C 224) 1; Council Directive 93/22,
1993
O.J.
(L 141) 27 (EEC).
192. Council Directive
2004/39,
2004
O.J.
(L 145) 1 (EC).
193. Id.at 39.
194. Id. at 1.
195. Id.at 3.
196.
Karen
M. Smith, The Need for Centralized Securities Regulation in the
European Union, 24 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 205, 210
(2000).
197. Case C-101/94, E.C.
Commission v. Italy,
1996
E.C.R.
I-2691, [1996 3 C.M.L.R. 754 (1996).
198. Council Directive
2004/39, art. 1,
2004
O.J.
(L 145) 1, 8 (EC).
199. Council Directive
2004/39, art. 2,
2004
O.J.
(L 145) 1, 8 (EC).
200. Council Directive
93/22, art. 3,
1993
O.J.
(L 141) 27, 37 (EEC).
201. See Council
Directive 2004/39, art. 5,
2004
O.J.
(L 145) 1, 12 (EC).
202. Id. at 18.
203. Id. at 17.
204. Council Directive
92/49,
1992
O.J.
(L 228) 1 (EEC),amended by Council Directive 95/26, 1995
O.J. (L 168) 7 (EC); Council Directive 92/96,
1992
O.J.
(L 360) 1 (EEC),amended by Council Directive 95/26, O.J. (L
168) 7 (EC).
205. Karmel, supra note
39, at 27.
206. Council Directive
85/611,
1985
O.J.
(L 375) 3 (EEC).
207. Allan S. Mostoff
& Olivia P. Adler, Collective Investment Vehicles, C700
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 499, 534 (1991).
208. Harold S.
Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, International Capital Markets and
Securities Regulation § 50:29 (2005) (quoting Council Directive
85/611/EEC, art. 1,
1985
O.J.
(L 375) 3 (EEC).
209. Council Directive
85/611, art. 4,
1985
O.J.
(L 375) 3 (EEC).
210. Council Directive
85/611, art 1,
1985
O.J.
(L 375) 3 (EEC).
211.
Samuel
Wolff, Securities Regulation in the European Community, 20 Denv.
J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 99, 141 (1991).
212. Warren, supra note
38, at 218-19.
213. Council Directive
89/646,
1989
O.J.
(L 386) 1 (EEC).
214.
Samuel
Wolff, Recent Developments In European Union Securities Law, 30
Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 292, 296 (2002).
215. Devgun, supra
note 59, at 464.
216.
Gilles
Thieffry, Towards a European Securities Commission, J.Int'l Fin.
Mkts.1999, 1(7), 300, 300 (1999).
217. See, e.g., Case
T-67/01, JCB Service v Commission,
2004
E.C.R.
II-49.
218. Convention 90/436,
1990 O.J. (L 225) 10 (EEC).
219. Convention on
Insider Trading, European Treaty Series No. 130, Strasbourg, 20.IV
(open to both non-member and Member States). The convention
essentially provides for mutual assistance and cooperation by the
authorities regarding investigation of financial frauds. Id.
220. Id. art. 1.
221. Id. art. 2.
222. See
Case
C-499/03, Nahrungsmittel GmbH v. Commission of the European
Communities, 2005 E.C.R. I-1751; Case
C-253/00,AntonioMuñoz y Cia SA, Superior Fruiticola SA v Frumar
Ltd., Redbridge Produce Mktg. Ltd.,
2002
E.C.R.
I-7289.
223. Council Regulation
2137/85, 1985 O.J.(L 199) 1 (EEC).
224.
Hans-Juergen
Zahorka, EEIG European Economic Interest Grouping, 5
(2001)available at
www.eito.org/download/EEIG.pdf.
225. Warren, supra note
38, at 201.
226. Thieffry,supra note
216, at 301.
227.
15
U.S.C.
§ 78j (2000) (prohibiting "any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange ... [t]o use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered...any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.").
228.
17
C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2004) (stating "[i]t shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.").
229.
U.S.
v. Svoboda 347 F.3d 471, 475 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2003).
230. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).
231. See, e.g., Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co.,
69
F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (recognizing implied action under
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act).
232. Bradford Third
Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders,
[1941
2
All ER 205 (House of Lords 1941) (explaining the tort of
deceit).
233. See, e.g., Case
C-28/99, Criminal Proceeding Against Verdonck,
2001
E.C.R.
I-3399 (stating that "Article 6 of Directive 89/592 does not
preclude the application of legislative provisions of a Member
State which, as regards the prohibition of use of inside
information, are more stringent than those laid down by the
directive").
234. Warren, supra note
38, at 220.
235. Smith, supra note
196, at 216.
236. See, e.g.,
Michael
Gruson,Supervision
of Financial Holding Companies in Europe: The EU Directive on
Supplementary Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, 36 Int'l
Law. 1229, 1235-1236 (2002) (stating "[t]he existing EU
legal framework for the supervision of financial institutions is
incomplete because it only covers the so-called sectoral
supervision, that is, supervision over institutions within a
particular sector of the financial industry. Cross-sectoral
supervision of financial groups, combining institutions from
different financial sectors, exists only to a limited extent.").
237. Smith, supra note
196, at 217.
238. Karmel, supra note
39, at 33.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 35.
241. Id.
242. See Thieffry,supra
note 216, at 301.
243.
U.S.
Const.,
art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
244. Id. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3.
245. Adam Smith,An
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations Ch. 2
(University of Chicago Press 1976) (1776).
246.
Sandra
Eden, Corporate Tax Harmonisation in the European Community, 6
Brit. Tax Rev.624, 624 (2000).
At an
economic level the issue is simple--in order for the single market
to operate smoothly, the aggregate effects of 15 tax systems
should ensure that there are neither disincentives nor incentives
for business to be conducted in one place rather than another.
This is actually rather easily achieved at a technical level. If
all Member States operate the same tax system, using the same tax
base and rates, and exempt all foreign income, there will be
perfect neutrality as to location. The overlay of the real world
with its political and social issues makes matters more difficult.
This makes it necessary to unpack the notion of neutrality in
order to understand more clearly the ways in which the
inter-relationship of national tax systems causes problems of
distortion, and what can be done about them.
Id.
According to
Commission notice 96/C 68/06 on the de minimis rule for State aid
(OJ 1996 C 68, p. 9, the de minimis notice), which amends the
Community guidelines of 20 May 1992 on State aid for small and
medium-sized enterprises as indicated in Commission notice 92/C
213/02 (OJ 1992 C 213, p. 2), Article 92(1) of the Treaty is to be
considered as not applying to aid the amount of which is below the
ceiling of ECU 100 000 over a three-year period beginning when the
first de minimis aid is granted.
Id.
250. Id.
251. Eden, supra note
246, at 633.
252. Case 73/79,
Commission v. Italy,
1980
E.C.R.
1533 (stating "the method of financing an aid cannot be
isolated from consideration of the aid properly so-called.").
253. Case 47/69, France
v. Commission,
1970
E.C.R.
487.
254. Case 78/76,
Steinike & Weinlig v. Germany,
1977
E.C.R.
595 (stating "the prohibition in Article 92 (1) is neither
absolute nor unconditional since Article 92 (3) and Article 93 (2)
give the Commission a wide discretion and the Council extensive
power to admit aids in derogation from the general prohibition in
Article 92 (1).").
255. See Case 27/67,
Firma Fink-Frucht GmbH v Hauptzollamt Muenchen Landsbergerstrasse,
1968 E.C.R. 327.
256. Case C-114/91,
Criminal Proceedings Against Gerard Jerome Claeys,
1992
E.C.R.
I-6559 (stating "[i]ndividuals cannot therefore simply, on
the basis of Article 92 alone, challenge the compatibility of an
aid with Community law before the national courts or ask them to
decide as the main or a subsidiary issue on any incompatibility
....").
257. Id.
258.
Case
34/67, Firma Gebruder Luck v. Hauptzollamt Koln-Rheinau, 1968
E.C.R. 359.
259. Case 17/81, 1982
E.C.R. 1331.
260. Devgun, supra
note 59, at 451-470.
261. Id.
262. Case
C-307/97,Compagnie de Saint-Gobain v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt,
1999
E.C.R.
I-6161.
263. Case 270/83,
Commission v. France,
1986
E.C.R.
273 (stating that "by not granting to the branches and
agencies in France of insurance companies whose registered office
is in another Member State on the same terms as apply to insurance
companies whose registered office is in France the benefit of
shareholders ' tax credits in respect of dividends paid to such
branches or agencies by french companies, the French Republic has
failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 52.").
264.Compagnie de
Saint-Gobain,
1999
E.C.R.
I-6161.
Article 52 of
the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 43 EC) and Article 58
of the EC Treaty (now Article 48 EC) preclude the exclusion of a
permanent establishment in Germany of a company limited by shares
having its seat in another Member State from enjoyment, on the
same conditions as those applicable to companies limited by shares
having their seat in Germany, of tax concessions taking the form
of:
-- an
exemption from corporation tax for dividends received from
companies established in non-member countries (corporation tax
relief for international groups), provided for by a treaty for the
avoidance of double taxation concluded with a non-member country,
-- the
crediting, against German corporation tax, of the corporation tax
levied in a State other than the Federal Republic of Germany on
the profits of a subsidiary established there, provided for by
German legislation, and
-- an
exemption from capital tax for shareholdings in companies
established in non-member countries (capital tax relief for
international groups), also provided for by German legislation.
Id.
[T]he
obligations which Community law imposes on the Federal Republic of
Germany do not affect in any way those resulting from its
agreements with the United States of America and the Swiss
Confederation. The balance and the reciprocity of the treaties
concluded by the Federal Republic of Germany with those two
countries would not be called into question by a unilateral
extension, on the part of the Federal Republic of Germany, of the
category of recipients in Germany of the tax advantage provided
for by those treaties, in this case corporation tax relief for
international groups, since such an extension would not in any way
affect the rights of the non-member countries which are parties to
the treaties and would not impose any new obligation on them.
Id.
266. For a good
description of the development of the idea of a race to the bottom
due to regulatory competition in the U.S. as a basis for a
comparitive analysis of EU law,see
Catherine
Holst, Note, European Company Law After Centros: Is the EU on
the Road to Delaware? 8Colum. J. Eur. L. 323, 332 (2002).
267. Eden, supra note
246, at 633.
268. Resolution of the
Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States On a Code of Conduct for Business Taxation,
1998
O.J.
(C 002) 2,available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uriLEX:41998X0106:EN:NOT.
269. Eden, supra note
246, at 633.
270. Council Directive
77/799,
1977
O.J.
(L 336) 15 (EEC).
271. Eden, supra
note 246, at 628.
272. Council Directive
90/434,
1990
O.J.
(L 225) 1 (EEC),amended by Council Directive 2005/19/EC,
2005
O.J.
(L 058) 19.
273. Eden, supra
note 246, at 630.
274. Council Directive
90/435,
1990
O.J.
(L 225) 6 (EEC),amended by Council Directive 2003/123,
2004
O.J.
(L 7) 41 (EC).
275. Council Directive
2003/123,
2004
O.J.
(L 7) 41, 41 (EC).
276. Eden, supra note
246, at 628.
277. See Case 270/83,
Commission v. Fr.,
1986
E.C.R.
273; Case C-279/93, Finanzant Koln-Altstadt v. Schumacker,
1995
E.C.R.
I-225; Case C-80/94, Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Directe
Belastingen,
1995
E.C.R.
I-2493; Case C-311/97, Royal Bank of Scot. v. Elliniko
Dimosio, 1999 E.C.R. I-2651
278. See generally Eden,
supra note 246.
279. Case C-250/95, 1997
E.C.R. I-2471.
280. Id. The operant
portion of the case states very precisely the issue of offsetting
gains and losses:
Article 52 of
the Treaty does not preclude a Member State from making the
carrying forward of previous losses, requested by a taxpayer which
has a branch in its territory but is not resident there, subject
to the condition that the losses must be economically related to
the income earned by the taxpayer in that State, provided that
resident taxpayers do not receive more favourable treatment. On
the other hand, that article does preclude the carrying forward of
losses from being made subject to the condition that, in the year
in which the losses were incurred, the taxpayer must have kept and
held in that State accounts relating to his activities carried on
there which comply with the relevant national rules. The Member
State concerned may, however, require the non-resident taxpayer to
demonstrate clearly and precisely that the amount of the losses
which he claims to have incurred corresponds, under its domestic
rules governing the calculation of income and losses which were
applicable in the financial year concerned, to the amount of the
losses actually incurred in that State by the taxpayer.
Id.
281. Id.
(citingSchumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225 andWielockx,
1995
E.C.R.
I-2493).
282. Case C-1/93,
Halliburton Servs. BV v. Staatssecretaris van Financien,
1994
E.C.R.
I-1137. "[T]he rules regarding equality of treatment forbid
not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality or, in the
case of a company, its seat, but all covert forms of
discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of
differentiation, lead in fact to the same result." Id.(citing Case
C-330/91, The Queen v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte
Commerzbank, 1993 E.C.R. I-4017).
283. C-55/98,
Skatteministeriet v. Bent Vestergaard,
1999
E.C.R.
I-7641.
284.Futura
Participations SA,
1997
E.C.R.
I-2471.
285. Id. "Such a system,
which is in conformity with the fiscal principle of
territoriality, cannot be regarded as entailing any
discrimination, overt or covert, prohibited by the Treaty." Id.
286. Case C-446/03,
Marks & Spencer PLC v. Halsey (Her Majesty's Inspector of
Taxes), 2005 E.C.R. 00.
287. Id.
In accordance
with the principle of territoriality applicable both in
international law and in Community law, the Member State in which
the parent company is established has no tax jurisdiction over
non-resident subsidiaries. As regards the latter, tax competence
belongs in principle, in accordance with the usual allocation of
competence in such matters, to the States on whose territory they
are established and carry out commercial activities.
Id.
288. Case 78/76,
Steinike & Weinlig v. F.R.G.,
1977
E.C.R.
595.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. "In judging in
these cases whether state aid is compatible with the common market
complex economic factors subject to rapid change must be taken
into account and assessed. Article 93 of the Treaty therefore
provides for a special procedure whereby the Commission shall keep
aid under constant review." Id.
293.Steinike,
1977
E.C.R.
595.
294.
Case
C-446/03, Marks & Spencer PLC v. Halsey (Her Majesty's
Inspector of Taxes), 2005 E.C.R. 00.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299.Marks & Spencer,
2005 E.C.R. 00.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. "[W]hether state
aid is compatible with the common market complex economic factors
subject to rapid change must be taken into account and assessed."
Case 78/76, Steinike & Weinlig v. F.R.G.,
1977
E.C.R.
595.
303. "In each specific
situation, it is necessary to consider whether the fact that a tax
advantage is available solely to resident taxpayers is based on
relevant objective elements apt to justify the difference in
treatment."
Marks &
Spencer, 2005 E.C.R. 00.
304. "[I]n tax law, the
taxpayers' residence may constitute a factor that might justify
national rules involving different treatment for resident and
non-resident taxpayers. However, residence is not always a proper
factor for distinction." Marks & Spencer,
2005
E.C.R.
00.
305. Gildea, supra note
1, at 292.
306. Case 81/87, The
Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Comm'r of Inland Revenue, ex parte
Daily Mail and General Trust plc,
1988
E.C.R.
5483.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Statute of the
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59
Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993. In fact however the foundation of
general principles of law has a source of international law
natural law. Aaron Judson Lodge,Globalization: Panacea For The
World or Conquistador Of International Law and Statehood?, 7Or.
Rev. Int'l L. 224, 292 (2005); Jon M. Van Dyke, The Role of
Customary International Law in Federal and State Court Litigation,
26U. Haw. L. Rev. 361, 381 n. 123 (2004) (citing Grotius); Joel
Brandon Moore, The Natural Law Basis Of Legal Obligation:
International Antitrust and OPEC in Context, 36Vand. J. Transnat'l
L. 243, 273-275 (2003). This is because: (1) the ICJ is a creature
of treaty, not custom. As such, states may choose not to be bound
by its decisions; (2) its decisions do not have value as
precedent; and (3) general principles of law were a source of law
long before the ICJ was constituted. Thus, general principles of
law may be a source of law due to custom, for they are the
customary interpretations of law done by states.
311. See, e.g., Case
T-83/96, van der Wal v. Commission,
1998
E.C.R.
II-545 (stating "[i]t is settled case-law that fundamental
rights form an integral part of the general principles of law
whose observance the Community judicature ensures ...").
312. Case C-208/00,
Ueberseering BV v. Nordic Consruction Co. Baumanagement GmbH, 2002
E.C.R. I-9919.
313. Holst, supra note
266, at 328.
314. Case C-212/97, 1999
E.C.R. I-1459.
315. Holst, supra note
266, at 323.
316.Centros Ltd., 1999
E.C.R. I-1459 (stating "[i]t is true that according to the
case-law of the Court a Member State is entitled to take measures
designed to prevent certain of its nationals from attempting,
undercover of the rights created by the Treaty, improperly to
circumvent their national legislation or to prevent individuals
from improperly or fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of
Community law ....").
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. For an explanation
of means-end constitutional review, see Gerard J. Clark,An
Introduction to Constitutional Interpretation, 34Suffolk U. L.
Rev. 485, 499-500 (2001).
321. Case C-208/00,
Ueberseering BV v. Nordic Consruction Co. Baumanagement GmbH, 2002
E.C.R. I-9919.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Gildea, supra note
1, at 278.
327.Ueberseering BV,2002
E.C.R. I-9919.
328. Id.
329. Gildea, supra note
1, at 292.
330.
Council
Regulation 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE),
2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 (establishing the SE).
331. Id. at 4.
332.
Andreas
Kellerhals & Dirk Trueten, The Creation of the European
Company, 17 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 71, 76 (2002).
333. Council Regulation
2157/2001, art. 2(1),
2001
O.J.
(L 294) 1, 4 (EC).
334.
Charles
de Navacelle,Council Regulation EC 2157/2001 of October 8, 2001
Establishing The European Company Statute, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
199, 200 (2002).
335. Council Regulation
2157/2001, art. 8,
2001
O.J.
(L 294) 1, 4 (EC).