The Convention on the Rights of the Child ¹ (CRC) presents lofty goals for children's rights. It does not, however, present effective enforcement mechanisms for their implementation. This Article attempts to show how the positive goals of the CRC can be implemented via supplemental treaties and national legislation, and by a structured conceptualization of human rights, which renders those rights legally unambiguous.

Nearly all states have signed and ratified the CRC. ² Due to domestic politics, the United States has signed, but not yet ratified, the CRC. ³ The United States has, however, adhered to the optional *794 protocols on Child Soldiers and Child Prostitution. ⁴ Unlike many optional protocols to United Nations conventions, the optional protocols to the CRC do not provide an enforcement mechanism for the basic rights found in the CRC, but rather provide more precise definitions of the norms in the CRC. ⁵ Interestingly, in practice, U.S. courts sometimes already invoke the CRC. ⁶ Although the United States has not ratified it, the CRC is seen by U.S. courts as codifying customary international law, ⁷ or at least as evidence of customary international law. Prior to addressing these legal points in depth, it is useful to explain the problems of U.S. foreign policy, which explain why the United States takes an idiosyncratic and, indeed, problematic view of the CRC.

The CRC seeks to provide basic human rights to children; to raise *795 standards particularly in third world countries where abject poverty leads to the worst forms of abuse: sexploitation, child soldiers, child trafficking--places where even basic literacy is not attained, to say nothing of medical care or fair labor standards--and to create a monitoring and reporting system to improve the level of protection. Although occasional violations of children's basic rights do occur in first world countries, such are generally exceptional and sporadic, as opposed to systemic and endemic. ⁸ Child soldiers are just the most obvious example of asymmetric abuse in the third world resulting from endemic poverty. There are no child soldiers in the first world and relatively few child prostitutes. First world countries participate in the basic human rights treaties to set the example to emulate and as a sign of solidarity. This is why the non-participation of the United States is a critical problem: It is difficult to be the role model to emulate when you are not even in the game.

U.S. foreign policy tends to focus on bilateral rather than multilateral treaty relations. ⁹ This is in marked contrast to other first-world countries, which follow the lead of the United Nations and participate actively in the various human rights conventions promulgated by the United Nations. ¹⁰ That represents a weakness of U.S. foreign *796 policy, since it opens the United States to generally unfounded critiques as a non-respecter of human rights, and to justified critiques of unilateralism. The United States does not understand how to use the multilateral United Nations human rights convention system as a part of its foreign policy. Nor do U.S. diplomats understand the power of these laws--laws that other countries adopt, not because they are imposed from above, but because they are attractive due to being well-defined, helping those countries to work toward the universally desired goal of the good life for all. ¹¹ The United States has generally not effectively used this attractive power of well-defined and useful laws to promulgate global norms--rules of international law. ¹² Likewise, the United States does not effectively use "soft law"�--non-binding goals that are persuasive evidence of how courts should rule--to influence foreign countries. ¹³ The United States does not participate in the multilateral United Nations convention system and thus cannot influence it or set the example for expected behavior within that system. ¹⁴ The United States' refusal to actively participate in and shape conventions that are adhered to by scores of countries prevents the United States from influencing the content and applications of those conventions. This diplomatic disconnect is a real problem because the United States has fewer options for unilateralism due to massive war debt. ¹⁵ Furthermore, unilateralism has hurt the interests of the United States. The unilateralist policies of the Bush administration were self-destructive ¹⁶ and perceived as *797 instances of United States global domination. ¹⁷ Unilateralism invites conflict and resistance and also ignores collective wisdom. ¹⁸ Rather than misperceiving the United Nations convention system as a threat to domestic political interests or of foreign domination of domestic lawmaking, the United States can and should see the United Nations convention system as creating minimal commitments--most of which the United States already meets domestically ¹⁹--as ways to advance the mutual interests of the United States and its allies and trading partners in countries where the rule of law is less well developed. Through the use of reservations ²⁰ and the interpretation of remedies as inhering in state parties, rather than individuals, ²¹ any concerns of United States legislators regarding foreign influence over U.S. courts can be allayed. A careful consideration of the application and development of the CRC would allow it to be used, alongside the various other United Nations conventions, as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.

Part of the opposition to the CRC stems from religious conservatives. Right-wing religious sectarians believe, wrongly, that the CRC impedes the patriarchal family and that it interferes with the parent's ability to discipline children using corporal punishment. ²² *798 Many conservative individuals ²³ and groups ²⁴ critique the CRC, generally on religious grounds, believing that the CRC presents a threat to the traditional patriarchal family, that it is backdoor socialism, and similar unrealistic misapprehensions of the role of the United Nations in international affairs. ²⁵ The conservative and religious criticisms of the CRC are simply overstated. ²⁶ Problematic portions can be avoided through reservations or, preferably, qualified with codicils and diplomatic statements to clarify the exact extent of U.S. commitments. The problem with using the CRC as a punching bag against liberal internationalism is that it prevents forming rational, nuanced foreign policies, and also interferes with smooth international relations--including the cross-border adoption of children. ²⁷ The result of the failure to work out an effective cross-border adoption regime is bad for children, as children in orphanages are less cared for than those placed in stable supportive loving families. ²⁸

Just as religious fundamentalism limits flexible foreign policy, so too does the U.S. history of isolationism. ²⁹ U.S. isolationism failed to *799 prevent two global wars. ³⁰ The result was millions of needless deaths. ³¹ Non-engagement even encouraged such bloodshed due to policies of appeasement and political uncertainty as to whether and with whom the United States would ally itself. ³² Although rural Americans understandably wish to heed George Washington's warning and avoid global engagement, ³³ the fact of U.S. power ³⁴ makes global engagement unavoidable. The blame, however, is not merely at the feet of the uninformed rural mass; elite liberal urbanites also wish to avoid global engagement because of the costs. ³⁵ Because the United States is so *800 powerful and, for now, locked into expensive wars in Southwest Asia, ³⁶ the United States must overcome its linguistic limitations and lack of foreign policy expertise and engage the world in multilateral diplomacy. The United States is simply too large to ignore foreign affairs and now is too weak to impose its will unilaterally--which may be for the best, since unilateralism failed at great economic cost, and significant human cost, to attain a peaceful, stable world. ³⁷

Isolation resulting from religious fundamentalism, rurality, geography, and linguistic limitations explain, in part, why the United States pursued an ill-conceived unilateralist foreign policy. ³⁸ The CRC is just one example of the United States' inability to marshal the United Nations convention system and place it in the service of U.S. foreign policy. ³⁹ The CRC--like any of the United Nations conventions--could, and should, be part of a flexible, nuanced U.S. foreign policy of constructive engagement with a world it but ill understands due to geographic, cultural, and linguistic isolation. ⁴⁰ The United States has taken on very heavy debt ⁴¹ and has been forced to devalue the dollar, ⁴² *801 meanwhile its banking system has been further devastated by a private debt crisis in the housing market. The war debt exacerbated the housing crisis. ⁴³ The financial ruin of the United States treasury was wrought by failed unilateralist policies of war after war and torture on top of more torture, ⁴⁴ because unilateralism meant that the United States could not effectively invoke the material aid of its allies. One can compare the two gulf wars as instances of alliance financial politics. In the first gulf war, the President took a multilateralist approach. ⁴⁵ As a result, the United States had military and financial support; that war, in financial terms, was cost-free. ⁴⁶ In contrast, the second gulf war was waged unilaterally, and, as a consequence, the United States had few allies willing to contribute financially, and even fewer willing to contribute militarily. ⁴⁷ The policies of torture, secret prisons, the use of mercenaries, and assassination repelled U.S. allies and multiplied U.S. enemies: consequently, it is unsurprising that there was little or no military or financial support by U.S. allies for the U.S. wars in Southwest Asia and the Horn of Africa since 2000. ⁴⁸ Financially, as of 2007 the "global war on terror"� already cost six times as much as the gulf war of 1991 ⁴⁹--and the tab is still open.

Given the negative monetary effects of unilateral policies, the United States needs to shift to multilateral approaches. Rejecting obvious monstrosities such as torture and taking a multilateralist *802 cooperative approach would ease the military and financial burden and also reduce the number of opponents the U.S. faces. The United States has not been a good team player, despite being surrounded--surrounded by friends. Thus, it has not been able to invoke the aid and ideas of close historical allies, exacerbating political isolation. ⁵⁰

The CRC centers children's rights on the "best interests of the child,"� referencing the concept in articles 9, 18, 20, 21, 37, and 40. ⁵¹ That is one thing we all agree on: children should be protected and cared for. The problem is that, although the "best interests"� principle sounds good in theory, in practice it is problematic. Are "best interests"� defined culturally, materially, legally, or politically? ⁵² The treaty itself does not answer that question. ⁵³ That is, the "best interests"� standard is facially indeterminate, vague, and open-ended because it is inadequately defined in the treaty itself. ⁵⁴ It is also worth noting, for good or ill, that "best interests"� are likelier than not to be defined by Western values. ⁵⁵ Conversely, it is also possible that the "best interests of the child"� principle "will allow governments to hide behind the veil of culture and avoid addressing human rights abuses of children in their countries."� ⁵⁶ Though the text of the treaty calls for a child-centered "best interests"� approach to determining children's rights, the reality is generally otherwise: children are generally treated in a manner analogous to the manner in which property is treated in law. ⁵⁷ There are basic theoretical questions, which children's advocates must address and resolve in order for the ideal of the child's "best interests"� to be implemented in practice. ⁵⁸ A more exact definition of the child-centered approach is *803 necessary to clarify the ambiguity and to ensure that, indeed, the best interests of children will be served. U.S. interpretations of these ambiguous terms can, however, be provided through reservations to the treaty and declarations thereto. That is, with adequate political will and legal thought, these problems with the treaty can be overcome, at least regarding eventual U.S. obligations under the treaty. In sum: "It should be the goal of the international community to ensure that intercountry adoption is considered as a viable alternative in deciding the best interests of the world's children."� ⁵⁹

Part of the problem in accessing the ideas of rights expressed in the United Nations convention system is due to limitations within the liberal model of rights. Properly interpreted, many of the potential objections to the idea of individual rights based on international treaties--as opposed to the U.S. Constitution--can be obviated. First, naturally, any treaty rights must be constitutional to be enforced before U.S. courts, at least within U.S. borders and with respect to U.S. citizens. ⁶⁰ Rather than seeing treaty rights and constitutional rights as in conflict, international human rights and constitutional fundamental rights are correctly understood as complementary and harmonious. This can be cured by judges: courts rightly presume that statutes, treaties, and the Constitution are not conflicting and interpret them so that their obligations are consistent wherever possible. ⁶¹

When we think of fundamental rights, the United States tends to interpret such rights as negative; as "freedoms from"�--generally, as freedoms from government interference, though, occasionally, as freedoms from private prejudice. ⁶² That is, the United States tends to *804 look at fundamental rights as procedural, not substantive, as "freedoms from"� rather than "rights to."� ⁶³ This is a classical "first generation"� approach to human rights (civil and political rights). ⁶⁴ Many of the rights described in the CRC are indeed "first generation"� rights and are clearly consistent with the U.S. Constitution: therefore, they would impose no new obligations on the United States. ⁶⁵

In contrast, however, fundamental rights can be seen as affirmative "rights to"�--as substantive claims to state resources. ⁶⁶ That is, they can be seen as "second generation"� collective rights (economic, social, and cultural rights). ⁶⁷ Some "second generation rights"� may be recognized by the United States, at least at the state level--the right to education (which is exclusively a state, not federal object of power) is the most obvious one. ⁶⁸ "Second generation"� international human rights are seen as problematic by the United States, first, domestically, since they may be seen as imposing new or uncertain obligations on the states. Secondly, affirmative "rights to"� may be seen as somehow imposing obligations on the United States with regard to foreign states. The *805 confusion is not helped by the fact that the CRC does not explicitly define which of its provisions concern economic, social, and cultural rights. ⁶⁹ Again, reservations and declarations by the United States with respect to the treaty can both shape the treaty and clarify the misconceptions.

The cost of non-participation by the United States in the CRC is this: other states then define the contours and limits of the treaty rules. Those treaty rules then coalesce into international customary law, resulting in rules that ultimately bind the United States--without the United States having contributed directly to the formation of those rules. Thus, by not participating actively in the CRC, the United States exposes itself to eventual customary law commitments, since it never objected to the emerging customary international law. The United States could, of course, strenuously resist and assert its own exceptionalism, seeking to carve out a place for itself as a persistent objector ⁷⁰ to a custom it rejects. To invoke exemption from customary international law as a "persistent objector,"� the objection must be made unequivocally, persistently, and ab initio--right from the start of the emergence of the international custom. It would be difficult to argue that the United States is objecting to a custom arising out of a treaty that it has signed.

As mentioned, the "best interests"� principle is ambiguous. By active participation in the CRC, the United States can help shape the contours of that principle. There is also ambiguity in the substantive rights that the CRC recognizes. A good typology of human rights distinguishes perfect claims-- i.e., vested rights--from imperfect claims, and also distinguishes between affirmative "rights to"� and negative "freedoms from."� ⁷¹ The generational theory of human rights ⁷² does provide such a typology, to a certain extent. The United States can dispel ambiguities in the convention by a principled, rational application of law expressed through reservations and declarations regarding the United Nations convention system--here, the CRC.

The problem with second generation rights, from the United States' free market, individualist perspective, is that second generation rights are redistributional resource claims, and possibly also the fact that some *806 second generation rights are collective, not individual. ⁷³ Clearly some of the rights in the CRC, such as the right to education, are second generation rights. Many of the second generation rights, however, are already recognized explicitly in the United States, whether constitutionally or via legislation at the state level. ⁷⁴ Therefore, we must remember that unlike the U.S. Constitution, U.S. treaties are not regarded as superior to ordinary federal legislation within the United States. ⁷⁵ There is, however, still the problem that treaties between the United States federal government and foreign states are considered the supreme law of the land. ⁷⁶ That is, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution elevates treaties above ordinary legislation of the several states in the United States, and courts have interpreted treaties to be superior to the constitutions of the several states as well. ⁷⁷ That makes the process of indicating U.S. commitments via declarations and reservations all the more important.

*807 There is, however, an argument against the view that treaties are superior to state constitutions. The federal government was formed by the consent of the states. ⁷⁸ Thus, any act of the federal government in opposition to any state's constitution should be seen as ultra vires. The United States federal government is a government of limited, enumerated powers. ⁷⁹ Treaties that exceed the powers and object of the federal power, which arrogate power to the federal government, are, as a matter of logic, unconstitutional. ⁸⁰

That is not, however, the current position taken by the United States Supreme Court. Missouri v. Holland suggests that treaties can, in fact, expand the federal power. ⁸¹ Foreign policy is exclusively the province of the federal government, ⁸² especially the presidency. ⁸³ The Court in Holland grounded the power to expand federal power by way of treaty as implicit in the Necessary and Proper Clause. ⁸⁴ The better view, however, is expressed in Reid v. Covert. ⁸⁵ There, a plurality of the Court held that a treaty could not violate the Fifth Amendment. ⁸⁶

One could qualify Holland as applying only to situations where the federal power is implied and where there is no contradiction between the expansion of federal power and the written text of the Constitution itself, including its amendments. Such an argument seems strained. The better view is found through logic, since law is right reasoning in accord with the nature of things. ⁸⁷ A treaty can be unconstitutional. ⁸⁸ An unconstitutional law cannot be enforced domestically. ⁸⁹ A treaty, *808 however, creates an obligation under international law. ⁹⁰ The validity of a treaty obligation under domestic law is irrelevant to its validity under international law. ⁹¹ Such a treaty would bind the United States in its relations to other states overseas. Nevertheless, such a treaty cannot, constitutionally, be given direct effect within the United States. That is the only logically consistent solution: to see the unconstitutional treaty, though a valid international law obligation, as being per se non-self executing at least until the treaty is somehow amended into constitutional conformity. Even there, the issue of whether such a treaty has retroactive domestic effect lurks. Happily this contorted hypothetical, a Gordian knot, is well beyond the topic of this paper and shall not be exposed further here.

In any case, by not declaring and reserving properly due to non-participation, the United States creates conflicting commitments as to the federated states and foreign States.

These fine points of U.S. constitutional law are in all events somewhat moot for two reasons. First, the affirmative substantive claims to resources that the CRC provides are already met either under the United States Constitution, state constitutions, or other laws. ⁹² Second, any problematic claims can and should be obviated through declarations, reservations, or determinations that the convention does not have direct effect, i.e., that the CRC, or some of its provisions, is not self-executing. ⁹³

*809 The CRC also invokes third generation rights. Third generation rights are redistributional claims. ⁹⁴ Third generation rights, however, are universally seen as aspirational goals, as hortatory objectives, or as the teleology toward which the law reaches. ⁹⁵ They are interpretive, persuasive evidence of the extent of positive legal commitments. ⁹⁶ Third generation rights are neither procedural "freedoms from"� nor are they substantive "rights to."� ⁹⁷ Third generation rights are merely aspirational goals--they have persuasive, interpretive value as to the extent of other substantive or procedural rights, but only persuasive value. ⁹⁸ Third generation rights do not create vested rights, but merely define desired goals: as such, however, they are teleologically important to the interpretation of the convention and to U.S. commitments. ⁹⁹ Third generation rights at first glance seem sweeping, implying a collectivist, redistributionist policy and a strong central State. In reality, however, they are not problematic positive commitments because they merely indicate the goals of the law. Third generation rights present goals: universally desirable goals, goals which the United States is already working toward, and which may be used by foreign states to align their values increasingly toward those of developed democracies--and as persuasive guides to the interpretation and application of positive law.

As noted, the CRC is generally a "paper tiger"�: the rights it protects sound good, but are, in practice, often unenforced. ¹⁰⁰ This is partly because of a lack of enforcement mechanisms within the convention itself, but also because the CRC likely does not create individually *810 enforceable rights. ¹⁰¹ The treaty on its own terms is not self-executing: it expressly calls for State Parties to undertake implementing legislation ¹⁰² to make its normative provisions ("oughts"�) positively binding. The only enforcement mechanism within the treaty itself is the filing of national reports of progress toward attaining the goals of the treaty. ¹⁰³ The lack of an enforcement mechanism supports the argument that the treaty is not self-executing and only creates obligations of State Parties to other State Parties, not rights held by individuals who are citizens or residents of State Parties. ¹⁰⁴ So, exactly how the United States chooses to implement and enforce the CRC is a matter of domestic U.S. law. The CRC obligates the United States to protect children, but leaves it to the United States to define just how to attain that goal.

Treaties operate analogically to contracts; contracts between states. Treaties, in principle, only bind states in their relations to each other. ¹⁰⁵ That is, treaties are presumed not to create individually enforceable rights, ¹⁰⁶ though that presumption can be overcome depending on the text of the treaty and the intention of the State Parties to the treaty. ¹⁰⁷

U.S. treaties are presumed not to be self-executing. ¹⁰⁸ A treaty will be found to be non-self-executing: "if the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation . . . if the Senate in giving consent to a treaty, or Congress by resolution, requires implementing legislation, or . . . if implementing legislation is constitutionally required."� ¹⁰⁹

Thus, in principle, the CRC does not create rights that may be *811 enforced by individuals, but rather only obligations of states toward other states. That view is strengthened by three facts. First, the CRC does not include any enforcement mechanisms and relies on the State Parties to enforce their rights against each other under the treaty by way of their political relations. ¹¹⁰ Second, Article 4 of the CRC obligates State Parties to implement the norms found in the CRC. ¹¹¹ This supports the inference that the CRC is not self-executing. The travaux préparatoires (the international equivalent of legislative history) do not indicate whether the CRC is or is not self-executing. ¹¹² Thus, whether the CRC is or is not self-executing is determined by national law. ¹¹³ Third, even if the CRC created individually-enforceable legal rights, many of those rights are presented as hortatory goals, not as vested rights. ¹¹⁴ Under the CRC, courts are free, and indeed encouraged, to see their own laws and the obligations of the CRC as mutually reinforcing. ¹¹⁵ U.S. legislation and international obligations are presumed to be consistent. ¹¹⁶ Just as ordinary legislation is presumed to be constitutional, ¹¹⁷ so too is ordinary legislation presumed to be consistent with U.S. treaty obligations and will be so interpreted wherever possible. ¹¹⁸ That is, barring a clear and compelling conflict between a treaty obligation and the domestic law, domestic law will be presumed valid. ¹¹⁹ The obligations of the CRC, however, do not appear to be inconsistent with any laws that this author is familiar with. Thus, on its face, the CRC does not present conflicting obligations to U.S. *812 federal or state legislation--because it creates obligations of the United States (and other State Parties) to each other--not private rights held and enforceable directly by individuals.

The CRC addresses its obligations to States. Furthermore, many of the rights created by the CRC are hortatory goals, not positive vested rights. ¹²⁰ The transformation of the hortatory goals of the treaty into positive, vested rights under national law is a matter for the State Parties to undertake in their national legislation. This view is reinforced by the fact that, unlike some of the United Nations conventions, the CRC does not include any enforcement mechanism via an optional protocol for enforcement of the rights. ¹²¹ Finally, any "direct effect"� of the CRC, that is, the self-executing nature of the treaty as a whole or any of its provisions, must be proven by the party invoking the provisions of the treaty, which is a general principle of treaty interpretation. ¹²²

Regarding the rights created by the CRC, some argue that rights discourse regarding children is inherently problematic. ¹²³ Certain scholars argue that it is paradoxical to accord rights to an ordinarily legally incapacitated subject. ¹²⁴ Children, especially young children, are generally not granted full legal capacity. ¹²⁵ Some argue that, as a result, the CRC is ineffective. ¹²⁶ I disagree. The difficulty with enforcing the rights of children is not the idea that children have rights or any paradox arising from children's legal capacity. Rather, the problem is with the concept of rights itself. Rights discourse is generally ill-considered and *813 is not presented in a historically or logically structured fashion. ¹²⁷ Further, even if the historical distinctions between first, second, and third generation rights were applied--in conjunction with an understanding of rights as perfect, i.e., vested, or imperfect, as affirmative "rights to"� or negative "freedoms from"�--there is still no enforcement mechanism for such rights within the treaty itself.

A reservation to a treaty operates to limit or void application of an article or articles of a treaty to the reserving State Party, to set forth that State Party's view of the meaning of the treaty, and/or to delimit the application of that treaty, namely to stop the treaty from being interpreted to imply legal points that are not in its own terms. ¹²⁸ Reservations are a very powerful instrument and, since the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, ¹²⁹ they are an ordinary part of contemporary, international treaty law. ¹³⁰ The United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. ¹³¹ The Vienna Convention, however, is seen today as a codification of customary international law and is so interpreted by the United States. ¹³² According to the Vienna Convention, ¹³³ a reservation must not be used to avoid the object and purpose of the treaty, ¹³⁴ a position found explicitly in the CRC. ¹³⁵ Reservations, however, may be used to delimit *814 and clarify the impact of the treaty on the reserving state, to express the views of the reserving state unequivocally as to the meaning of the reserved provisions of the treaty, or even of the treaty generally. ¹³⁶

Simply put, even if the CRC were interpreted to have portions that are self-executing and automatically given domestic effect without any enabling act, the United States could use reservations to avoid and delimit the applicability of any of the articles of the CRC. The non-ratification of the CRC comes down to a failure to use a nuanced and well-crafted multilateral diplomatic approach to protect and advance U.S. interests in a fashion coherent with U.S. allies' views and consistent with U.S. international obligations. Any objectionable portion of the CRC can be reserved out; likewise, the meaning of any contested article, in the view of the United States, can be clarified through the use of reservations. Thus, the CRC should have no negative effect on U.S. foreign policy or domestic law.

The legal doctrine of subsidiarity is the idea that local control, whenever possible, is to be preferred to control at a federal or supra-national level. The theory stems originally from Catholic theology, specifically from the encyclical Rerum Novarum (of new things). ¹³⁷ The doctrine of subsidiarity is not expressly written into the CRC. In the CRC, however, the theory is implicitly expressed in the idea of a "national preference"� to adoption, or even foster care or care in an orphanage to international adoption, ¹³⁸ as expressed in Articles 20(3) *815 and 21(b) (the idea of subsidiarity in another context also appears in Article 5). ¹³⁹ The United States rightly opposes the principle of "national preference"� in adoption because the principle denies children without parents the opportunity to find parents overseas. ¹⁴⁰ Article 21(b) of the treaty states: "inter-country adoption may be considered as an alternative means of [a] child's care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in the child's country of origin."� ¹⁴¹ The United States can avoid the effect of Article 21(b) by reserving its accession to the treaty contingent on the non-application of Article 21(b). Article 21(b) can simultaneously be rendered less harsh in application through the formation of bilateral adoption treaties with potential source countries. That is, multilateral and bilateral initiatives can be made complementary to the CRC and here should be.

Supplementary treaties to complement and complete the CRC are not only consistent with the CRC; they are also expressly envisioned in Article 41. ¹⁴² Article 41 makes clear that the CRC establishes global minimum standards--State Parties are not only allowed to, they are also encouraged to obtain the rights of children through their national law ¹⁴³ and other international laws, ¹⁴⁴--that is, (bilateral) treaties. Likewise, Article 11 requires States Parties to "take measures to combat the illicit transfer and non-return of children abroad,"� including promoting "the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements or accession to existing agreements."� ¹⁴⁵ Finally, international adoption is also covered by the 1993 Hague Convention in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, ¹⁴⁶ a treaty that the United States and dozens of other countries have signed and ratified. ¹⁴⁷ Those concerned with opening cross-border adoptions should look to the Hague Convention at least as much as to the CRC to find the remedies to the problem of cross-border adoption.

*816 Possible texts of such a reservation could run along these lines: "The text of Article 21(b) of the treaty says "Ëœif,"â„¢ not "Ëœonly if."â„¢ Nothing in this treaty shall be interpreted to impede the right of U.S. citizens to adopt foreign children whether under federal or state law. Article 21(b) shall not be applied to the United States."� Article 51 of the CRC specifically permits reservations to the treaty. ¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, State Parties are entitled to withdraw entirely from the CRC if they so choose. ¹⁴⁹ Thus, ratifying the CRC should have no ill effect on U.S. laws.

The CRC is intended to establish global minimum standards. It specifically authorizes State Parties to complement and complete the rights and provisions of the CRC through additional treaties. ¹⁵⁰ Thus, the United States' penchant for bilateralism, or regionalism with allies, could be pursued in a manner consistent with the CRC. For example, the United States could promulgate an international treaty on adoption and invite allies to adhere to it in order to avoid the harsh application of the subsidiarity principle. The CRC applies subsidiarity and home-country preference to avoid the problem of baby-trafficking. ¹⁵¹ In developed states such as the United States, the problem of institutional corruption is much less of a concern than in developing countries. One way to attain transparent international adoption would be through the establishment of bilateral or regional adoption treaties, which would meet the concerns of the CRC regarding baby-trafficking via transparent mechanisms for smooth and traceable international adoptions. Other declarations and conventions that flank the CRC are thus referenced in the next section for those who wish to pursue a deeper understanding of international rights of children.

In this section I wish merely to indicate the numerous sources of international children's law, so that other researchers and practitioners *817 can appreciate the body of existing norms that can be invoked before courts.